Updates

Other sources of stress come from differences over renewed efforts to forge an agreement with the Palestinian Authority headed by Mahmoud Abbas, and, in this context, the status of the Israeli anti-terror measures.

In addition, the overall decline of US influence, as reflected in Iraq, the return of Russia as a world power, the chaos in Pakistan, and other developments are forcing Israeli security planners to review the degree of security dependence on Washington.

For Israel, the Iranian nuclear weapons program is the most acute strategic threat, and the sudden shift in US policy as reflected in the NIE report – of which only a summary was declassified – was a major shock. The summary, and the subsequent headlines, declared: “We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Teheran halted its nuclear weapons program.”

While a footnote and subsequent paragraphs explained that this assessment was limited to only one aspect of the Iranian program – “weaponization” – and that the other more important aspects, including uranium enrichment, were continuing, the headline took the urgency, and the justification, out of the US-led coalition on Iran.

THESE developments abruptly ended 15 years of Israeli policy based on working with the international coalition to pressure Iran to drop its nuclear weapons program through sanctions and the threat of military action, if necessary. Within two weeks following publication of the NIE report, the momentum of the sanctions regime, built up slowly over recent years, was suddenly reversed. In short order, China and Malaysia signed contracts on energy development and supply with Iran, and Russia, which had withheld the fuel rods for the Bushehr nuclear reactor for at least one year, quickly dispatched two shipments.

In parallel, the leaders of the Sunni Arab component of the coalition to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state also concluded that the US had changed course. Egypt moved to improve relations with Iran, and Saudi Arabia welcomed Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Mecca for the haj.

THE THREAT of a US-led military attack on Iranian nuclear installations had become extremely unlikely. This was perhaps the main purpose of the officials who wrote the published summary – to make it all but impossible for President Bush to order an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities in the last year of his administration.

Despite the central importance of these issues, the years of strategic coordination meetings, and the repeated American assurances, Israeli policy-makers were apparently not consulted on the decision to release the NIE report, the timing, or the very contentious wording. Israel could do nothing as the US crippled these two primary sources of pressure, which had contributed to the Iranian decision to close (or hide) the blatant aspects of nuclear weapons development in 2003.

As a result, although President Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and others have put Palestinian-Israel peace efforts after the Annapolis meeting on the top of their agenda for this trip, the primary Israeli issue is Iran. On his way to the US at the end of November, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert explained the logic of the “Annapolis process” in terms of the coalition to stop Iran, and the need to involve the Saudis and other Arab states in this coalition by demonstrating movement and hope on the Palestinian track. But two weeks after Annapolis, with the release of the NIE report, this rationale became irrelevant.

=46OR THESE reasons, proposals that the Bush visit be accompanied by discussions of a US-Israel defense treaty are unrealistic. A treaty would limit Israel’s freedom of action, and while the assistance provided by the US for 40 years may be unprecedented, it cannot substitute for an independent Israeli military capability when vital interests are at stake.

The political maneuvering in Washington that apparently led to the wording of the NIE, and the differences emerging over the relaxing of security measures related to hopes for a breakthrough in negotiations with the Palestinians, are pointed reminders of the limits of even the closest of alliances between sovereign nations.

In just 45 days between November 2007 and January 2008, President Bush will not only have played host at Annapolis to the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships but will have also enjoyed their hospitality over three days in Jerusalem and the West Bank.  In the interim, his Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has appointed a new Special Envoy for Middle East Security, General James Jones, to handle the complex security challenges of a durable Israeli-Palestinian agreement[i], and played a leading role in the international donors conference in Paris.[ii]  This series of diplomatic overtures represent the some of the most visible developments to have been advanced by George W. Bush’s White House since he took office in January 2001, and are the source of a renewed public discourse about the fate of Israeli-Palestinian peace.  But to what extent will Bush’s visit serve to follow up the modest achievements reached in Maryland, and just how significant is his imminent tour of the region for Israel at this juncture?

Seven years on…

George W. Bush entered the White House in 2001 after having witnessed his predecessor Bill Clinton’s ultimate failure, for all his immense efforts, to broker a peace accord at Camp David, and in the midst of what had shortly thereafter degenerated into the Second Intifada.  U.S. policy remained markedly disengaged and remarkably haphazard in the face of violent and escalating daily conflict, which then-secretary of state Colin Powell maintained was essentially for the parties themselves to resolve.  9/11, which globalised the phenomenon of Islamist radicalism, followed by a strategic suicide bombing campaign in which a packed Tel Aviv bar and Jerusalem shopping mall were blown up, naturally forced the Bush administration to intensify its role.  Publication of the Quartet’s Road Map in April 2003 notwithstanding, the White House soon despaired at Yasser Arafat’s lack of genuine tenacity to counter Palestinian terror.  Not until after Arafat’s death and Israel’s subsequent unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in August 2005 did the U.S. gradually begin to re-establish a facilitating role in a peace dialogue between Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.[iii]

It might therefore be assumed that Bush’s visit to Israel this week marks a screeching gear change in the final lap of a presidency in which his manoeuvring on Israel/Palestine has been conspicuously steered from the back seat throughout his two-term tenure.  Yet despite the tendency for White House incumbents to focus on foreign policy as they enter the lame-duck phase of their presidential tenure, Bush has not performed a bizarre policy u-turn after seven years of relative inertia.

Whilst Baghdad’s future will be discussed across the region, the primary issue on the table – both in the Gulf and Israel – is Iran.[v]  The U.S. president will be warmly received by the Arab oil emirates who are concerned about Iran’s increasing regional influence and muscle-flexing.  Israel is keen to undo damage done by the November 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, which, though its findings were initially misinterpreted by many, worryingly confirms that Iran is trying to master the nuclear enrichment process, at a level beyond that which would be necessary for producing electricity.  Israel simply cannot afford to allow policy to wither on a matter of an existential threat.  As a danger to global stability, sustained diplomatic isolation of Iran in spite of damage caused by the NIE report is a shared objective both of Israel and the White House.

As such, President Bush will be using his visit to reiterate his concerns about Iranian intentions and to set minds at rest that U.S. policy towards Tehran will remain unchanged so long as Iran continues to enrich uranium.  Furthermore, shoring up regional support in the Arab world, in order to be properly prepared for a potential future showdown with Iran if it fails to accede to UN demands, is at the heart of Bush’s mission.[vi]

Annapolis as catalyst, but the schism persists

In addition to tackling Iran, Bush, flanked by Condoleezza Rice and National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, will attempt to provide momentum for the Joint Understanding to which Israel and the Palestinians subscribed at Annapolis, which provided for the launching of immediate negotiations in an effort to conclude a two-state peace agreement before the end of 2008.[vii]  In that light, it is hoped that a visit from the world’s most powerful leader will help reinvigorate bilateral talks.

No real bilateral developments have occurred since Annapolis.  That no trilateral meeting is scheduled between Bush, Olmert and Abbas implies that the Americans are not going to be rolling up their sleeves to get bogged down in arbitration on borders or refugees.[viii]  Nonetheless, isolated Hamas officials in Gaza are mistaken to dismiss the visit as nothing more than a “photo opportunity.”[ix]  Air Force One’s arrival will shine the international media spotlight on peace talks once again, and President Bush will try to generate momentum through his words of support and show of solidarity with Olmert and Abbas.

This impetus is required.  Whilst a stagnant month is immaterial in the trajectory of this perennial conflict, it is less inconsequential in the scheme of the current talks, whose shelf life effectively expires when Bush vacates the Oval Office.[x]  Moreover, events on the ground, which the parties are trying to traverse without being overshadowed by them, have – perhaps inevitably – frustrated substantive progress.

The spanners being thrown in the works are not unfamiliar.  The “Har Homa crisis”[xi] sparked by plans to build new housing in the East Jerusalem neighbourhood has enabled the Palestinians to generate pressure on Olmert concerning Israeli settlements beyond the Green Line.  It also led President Bush to admit last week that settlement expansion is an “impediment” to the success of the revived peace efforts.[xii]  On the other hand, PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s own admission that Palestinian security forces are incapable at present of providing a viable security partnership is consistent with senior Israeli military analysis which contends that only due to the IDF’s presence has the West Bank not fallen, like Gaza, into Hamas control.[xiii]  The shooting of two off-duty Israeli soldiers by members of the PA security forces last week has underscored that failure.[xiv]

The third significant area in which Bush’s efforts will be concentrated throughout his tour will be in maximising whatever broader regional support and stability can be extrapolated from Annapolis.[xvii]

In his meetings in the Gulf and in Sharm el-Sheikh, the U.S. will seek to harness a deeper, regional commitment to Tony Blair’s project of strengthening Palestinian institutions that will provide economic and political security to a future Palestinian state.  Bush is set to accompany Blair on a tour of the initiatives he is heading up in the West Bank.  Arab support for the economic and political tracks of Israel-Palestinian negotiations, and for relations between Israel and the Arab world at large, will therefore also figure on the president’s to-do list.[xviii]

Tick tock, tick tock…

Such a lightning visit cannot possibly overcome the challenges that lie ahead for Israelis and Palestinians to resolve following Bush’s departure.  Simply, elbow grease and determination will be required of the two parties.  As Israel’s strongest ally, it is thought that any of the prospective candidates to supersede Bush will mediate if required.  Yet this president is mindful of his own clock ticking.  If a framework agreement on permanent status issues which is ultimately implemented after his departure from the Oval Office can at least be drawn up by the end of the year, George W. Bush would earn a place in Middle East history not only for the Iraq war but also for his part in orchestrating enduring political conciliation that was initiated on his watch.

What should President George W. Bush, currently visiting the Middle East, expect to achieve during his last year in office, even as the American people choose his successor?

The answer could not possibly be objectively clearer, yet subjectively more obscure. The gap between the real Middle East versus how it is perceived by all too many people in Washington and in the academic-journalistic elite is far too wide.

Three quick examples are useful to underline this point: First, the Annapolis summit was hailed throughout America and the West as a big success. In the region, however, less than one-fifth of Israelis and Palestinians thought it had done any good. People here knew better.

Second, many in the US have hailed what seems to be a de-escalation of American pressure on Iran over the nuclear issue. The response by Gulf Arab states, though, has been to conclude that America is weak and retreating, followed by their escalated efforts to make their own appeasement deal with Teheran.

Antagonism over Iraq should not be allowed to discredit the need for a strong policy that confronts extremist forces. For you, the best-case outcome would be having a legacy judged on that basis, as the president who stood up after September 11 to the challenge of a new anti-American threat. Adopting some of your enemies’ worst ideas will neither win their respect nor help the Middle East.