Home Update The Legacy of Shimon Peres, z”l/ Iran’s next Supreme Leader

The Legacy of Shimon Peres, z”l/ Iran’s next Supreme Leader

The Legacy of Shimon Peres
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Update from AIJAC

Oct. 7, 2016

Update 10/16 #01

Today’s Update features some intelligent reflections from Israel on the life and legacy of elder statesman Shimon Peres, who passed away at age 93 last week. In addition, it also contains an important article on the likely succession to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the implications of the choice.

We lead with some thoughts on what Peres’ long career and political legacy meant to Israel from David Makovksy, today at the Washington Institute, but before that, a journalist who traveled extensively with Peres on his travels.  Makovsky recalls Peres as someone defined by his endless vitality, relentlessly intent on securing Zionism in the present to ensure a better future for his people, and for the wider region. Makovsky says the key to Peres’ career was the Zionist belief that Jews must not wait for others to define their future, but shape it themselves – something he did by first building up Israel’s defence capabilities, by seeking vital outside alliances, and finally through pushing for peace with the Palestinians. For all the details of Makovsky’s argument, CLICK HERE. Another journalist who recalls how Peres touched his own life, in the way he affected so many Israelis, is Times of Israel editor David Horovitz.

Next up, Amotz Asa-El looks more at the details – and the many ups and downs – of Peres’ long career in public life. He recalls how Peres’ brilliance as a technocrat led David Ben -Gurion to put him in charge of Israel’s defence procurement at the age of 24 – but that Peres’ later efforts to enter politics were riddled with problems, some attributable to Peres’ own mistakes. Peres was often disliked intensely by many in Israel – which did not really change until he became President at the age of 84, after which he was “universally revered as the Zionist revolution’s Last Mohican, and Israeli society’s collective grandfather.” For this look at the real story of Peres’ amazing, but complex, career, CLICK HERE. Plus, more on Peres’ role in Israel’s nuclear program is here.

Finally, this Update brings you an important look at the succession speculation occurring in Iran about the next Supreme Leader, written by Ray Takeyh, an expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. Takeyh says that, contrary to hopes that the Iranian regime might liberalise as the old guard represented by current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei passes from the scene, in fact, one of the most reactionary figures in Iran’s ruling elite, Hojat al-Islam Seyyed Ibrahim Raisi, appears to be being groomed to take over. He notes that Raisi is the candidate of the Revolutionary Guard, which increasingly dominates Iranian political power, and has spent his entire career in the Islamic republic’s bodies enforcing strict orthodoxy on the country, and if anything, is likely to be more extreme in foreign policy and repressive at home than Khamenei. For Takeyh’s complete and very knowledgeable discussion of the Iranian succession issue, CLICK HERE

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Article 1

Shimon Peres was Israel’s quintessential Zionist

 

David Makovsky

Times of Israel, September 28, 2016, 10:32 pm

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Article 2

Beloved – At Long Last

 

Shimon Peres’s lifelong quest for popularity encapsulated the frequently tragic voyage from Exile to Zion

Amotz Asa-El

Jerusalem Post, 30 September

“A car for every worker,” promised Shimon Peres in 1965 in one of the most original, tight, and catchy election slogans ever coined here. 

Yet the setting in which it emerged would later loom as the dividing line between Peres’s years 18 as a prodigious technocrat and his 42 years as a controversial and often reviled politician whose rocky journey to public affinity is an emblem of the Zionist journey from despair to hope. 

Shimon Peres died universally beloved, but he spent a political eon as the punching bag of political rivals, ideological enemies, and social discontents. 

During 66 consecutive years in public office Peres proceeded from civil servant through politician to statesman, and at the same time also from brilliance through tragedy to improbable consolation. 

The brilliance showed during his years as a technocrat, which began in 1947, when at age 24 David Ben-Gurion brought him into the circle with which he was creating the IDF. 

Following assignments as purchaser of the IDF’s first battleships and fighter planes, Peres became director-general of the Defense Ministry in 1953, at age 30. It was the ultimate technocratic power job, an unelected position which placed Peres in charge of vast budgets and thousands of people while answering directly to an omnipotent prime minister who trusted him blindly. 

This unique location in the public fray did not change even after Peres’s entry into the Knesset in 1959, because Ben-Gurion immediately appointed him deputy defense minister, a position in which the rooky lawmaker Peres effectively continued doing what he did until then – run the military-industrial complex. 

It was in those technocratic years that Peres first displayed the combination of vision and provocation that would both dominate and haunt his career. 

On the one hand, he built from scratch Israel’s military and aerospace industries that later made missiles, tanks, aircraft, satellites, an jets, but back then had yet to produce even their first Uzi. On the other hand, when he negotiated a groundbreaking arms deal with France he did it behind the Foreign Ministry’s back.  

The result was a lifelong enmity with then-foreign minister Golda Meir, who would later sideline Peres as a minister in her cabinet. 

The same pattern repeated itself with Israel’s nuclear program, a top-secret operation which Peres largely conceived and led, and of which hardly anyone knew until Ben-Gurion dramatically announced its completion. While privy to such secrets, Peres was sowing jealousy and making enemies, often passively, while enjoying Ben-Gurion’s personal protection. 

It was against that background that Peres entered parliament in 1959 without working his way up from local politics and without ever being a backbencher. The price of this shortcut would prove hefty. 

THE HARDSHIPS of real political life first hit Peres in 1965, when he coined that election slogan. 

Ben-Gurion had split from Labor and launched a competitor, Rafi, which fielded some of the most promising young Israelis, like Moshe Dayan, Teddy Kollek, Chaim Herzog, and Yitzhak Navon, while claiming to represent Israel’s youth, courage and ingenuity. As Rafi’s secretary-general, Peres was now a party chief. That, not the transition to lawmaker, was his political baptism by fire. 

It was a grand failure. Despite that sharp election slogan, Rafi won a mere 10 Knesset seats and ended up languishing in the opposition. When it joined the coalition two years later, in the wake of the approaching Six Days War, it was as Labor’s stepsister. Peres would only return to executive office in 1969, as a junior minister in Golda Meir’s cabinet in the years leading to the Yom Kippur War. 

That war would transform Peres’s career, as it finally brought down Labor’s older generation and ultimately landed him in the defense minister’s seat, where he was tasked with rebuilding the bruised IDF – a challenge he stormed with relish and success. 

However, while making the most of his technocratic experience, Peres-the-politician now found himself at loggerheads with Yitzhak Rabin. It was a rivalry that exposed Peres-the-technocrat’s other political weakness – his position as an immigrant bureaucrat among battle-scarred sabras. 


Peres as Defence Minister greets commandos following the 1976 Entebbe raid – but despite his huge role in building the Israeli security forces, could not compete politically with war hero Yitzhak Rabin

Rabin, a warrior of few words and broken sentences, loathed the worldly bookworm with whom he was now compelled to share a political bed. 

Having arrived here from prewar Poland at age 12, Peres’s efforts to emphasize his teenage years as a Galilean farmer in Kibbutz Alumot were no public match for Rabin’s record as the military commander who at 26 broke open the road to Jerusalem, and at 45 defeated three armies in six days. 

Ironically, what Peres suffered as a perceived immigrant paled compared with what awaited him as a perceived veteran, in his troubled political career’s next phase, following Yitzhak Rabin’s resignation. 

PERES REACHED Labor’s helm in 1977, just when it first lost power, and thus found himself in the thankless position of a declining elite’s defender, symbol, and lightning rod. 

At a time when Menachem Begin endeared the second generation of the Middle Eastern immigrations, Peres became their antichrist, even though he had nothing to do with their perceived discrimination during the 1950s. Peres’s accomplishments as a technocrat were no match for the charismatic Begin’s effectiveness as an orator. In one particularly telling moment, the man who played such a central role in building Israel’s defenses had to be whisked away from an election rally in Beit Shemesh where hecklers pelted him with rotten tomatoes and eggs. 

With Likud magnetizing anyone who felt marginalized by the veteran establishment – the Middle Eastern immigrations, the working class, the ultra-Orthodox, the modern Orthodox, and small-business owners – Peres did not manage to win an election even after Likud led to major economic crisis in 1984. 

Absurdly, the immigrant who was kept at arms’ length by natives was now shunned by immigrants for whom he represented the native elite. 

Even so, the electoral tie of 1984 made Peres prime minister, a position in which he momentarily became what had never really been: popular. 

Challenged by 415-percent inflation, Peres imposed on the politicians, unions, and employers a harsh austerity plan that soon led the economy from near bankruptcy to stability, growth and wealth. Peres now loomed as a national savior. 

Fueled by this backwind, the man who had built some of the West Bank’s first settlements now embarked on his next project: peace. It was a choice that would undo all the popularity he had worked so hard to win. 

Peres’s original aim was to make peace not with Yasser Arafat but with King Hussein, and thus restore Jordan to the West Bank. As Yitzhak Shamir’s foreign minister, he struck a tentative deal with Hussein in London. However, Peres mishandled Shamir the way he mishandled Golda Meir in the 1950s, keeping him in the dark while hoping the prospect of peace would lead to Likud’s defeat.

It was the grand miscalculation of his entire career. 

Hussein avoided public confirmation of the deal, Peres lost the election of 1988, and then also Labor’s leadership – to Yitzhak Rabin. 

The subsequent Oslo Accords only intensified antagonism toward Peres as terror raged, before and after Rabin’s assassination. Peres won a Nobel Prize for peace, but he lost the 1996 election to Benjamin Netanyahu. Peres-the-statesman failed to deliver the goods that Peres-the-politician craved.  

The road from there to his career’s most humiliating moment, the defeat by Moshe Katsav in the 2000 presidential election, was short. 

Peres was now stung by a man who represented everything he was not: a lifelong politician who started off not as a builder of navies, air forces and nuclear reactors, but as a small-town mayor; a resident of not of posh north Tel Aviv, but of working-class Kiryat Malachi; an observant immigrant who, when Peres was in New York buying fighter planes, was a child en-route to Israel from Iran.

CHANGE CAME at 84, when Peres landed in the president’s seat after all. 


Peres ended his career an almost universally beloved elder statesman – but in fact spent most of his public life struggling for recognition and acceptance

Enlisting all his wisdom and poise, Peres rehabilitated the office that had been bruised when Katsav was convicted of sex offenses. For seven years he spent his days greeting, visiting, and celebrating the simple people from whom he was distant in his years as a technocrat, and whom he failed to endear as a politician. Now they were his daily company, a company of which he seemed to never have enough. 

For thousands, the journey from Exile to Zion resulted in tragedies of estrangement and exclusion. Peres embodied this syndrome, but unlike most of its victims, his tragedy now came undone.

Appeased, affable, and genuinely adored, the man who was once hated by thousands – became universally revered as the Zionist revolution’s Last Mohican, and Israeli society’s collective grandfather. 

At long last, Peres embodied the consensus he had long defied, and also won what he had once belittled, later craved, and so seldom tasted: the people’s love.
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Article 3

Iran’s likely next supreme leader is no friend of the West

By Ray Takeyh

Washington Post, September 26


 Hojat al-Islam Seyyed Ibrahim Raisi (L), Iran’s General Prosecutor, is increasingly being touted as the likely sucessor to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (R).

It is often suggested that the most consequential barrier to Iranian pragmatism is Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Once the elderly Khamenei passes from the scene, the argument goes, his successors will embrace prevailing international norms. The sunsetting restrictions of the nuclear deal need not be of concern, for a revamped Islamist regime will find global integration too tempting to discard for the sake of nuclear arms. The only problem with such expectations is that the candidate Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards are grooming to ascend to the post of supreme leader is one of the most reactionary members of Iran’s ruling elite. Ibrahim Raisi, Iran’s probable next supreme leader, could be the only person in the Islamic Republic who could cause people to miss Khamenei.

Raisi is 56 years old and, like Khamenei, hails from the city of Mashhad. After a stint in the seminary, he has spent his entire career in the Islamic Republic’s enforcement arm, serving as prosecutor general, head of the General Inspection Office and lead prosecutor of the Special Court of the Clergy, which is responsible for disciplining mullahs who stray from the official line. In one of his most notorious acts, he served as a member of the “Death Commission” that, in the summer of 1988, oversaw the massacre of thousands of political prisoners on trumped-up charges.

The position of the supreme leader was once thought to belong to an esteemed cleric known for his theological erudition. However, Khamenei’s lackluster religious credentials have paved the way for an even less impressive figure who has spent his professional life weaving conspiracies in the regime’s darkest corners.

Raisi’s background fits nicely with the Revolutionary Guards’ mission of crushing dissent. In a recent interview, Revolutionary Guards commander Muhammad Jaffari conceded that since 2005, the regime has come to see domestic insurrection as an even greater challenge to its existence than external pressures. The ideal successor to Khamenei would have to not only share the Guards’ perspective but also have close ties to the security organs and the judiciary. The Guards seem to have found their man. Raisi is being increasingly touted by them as a vanguard of the regime and an enforcer of its will.

Khamenei is an even more consequential backer. Iran’s supreme leader recently appointed Raisi to head one of Iran’s largest charitable foundations, Astan Quds Razavi. The foundation manages the Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad, which is visited by millions of pilgrims each year, operates many other enterprises and has vast land holdings. Though difficult to estimate with precision, the endowment’s value is reported to be upward of $15 billion. This appointment not only enhances Raisi’s national profile but also puts at his disposal enormous funds that he can use to nurture his own network of supporters and constituents. Khamenei, in essence, has opened the gates of the Islamic Republic’s murky financial universe to Raisi.

For Khamenei and his praetorian guards, the most important question is not just the survival of the regime but also its revolutionary values. They are determined that Iran will not become another China, which they see as having relinquished its ideological inheritance for the sake of commerce. The 2009 uprising may be a faded memory in Washington, but it was a watershed event for the guardians of the theocracy. Under Khamenei’s watchful eye, Iran is being transformed into a police state. The logical extension of these developments is a supreme leader who comes from the heart of Iran’s repressive organs.

Iran’s formal procedures would suggest that the Assembly of Experts will choose the next leader, but in reality that decision is being made right now in the state’s backrooms. President Hassan Rouhani may be a subject of U.S. fascination and hopes of a moderate regime, but he is a bystander in this important power play. Khamenei and the Guards appreciate that the next supreme leader will assume power in a precarious time. This leader has to share their penchant for conspiracy theories, demonstrate a contempt for the West and be prepared to shed blood on behalf of the regime. The next supreme leader has to not only believe in the theocracy’s mission of repression but also have been an integral part of that machinery.

No one in the Islamic Republic embodies these attributes more than Raisi. He seems to be the right man for the right time.

Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the co-author of “The Pragmatic Superpower: Winning the Cold War in the Middle East.”

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