Updates

1.

Yes, the elections are most probably coming soon. Yesterday evening, a source close to the men in charge told me they were examining dates toward the end of March. Not that Israel needs these elections. Not that there are such huge differences between the ideologies of the parties of the current coalition and the potential partners of the next coalition. Not that we should expect new and exciting policies to come out of a new coalition. Like in every election, the heads of parties are going to work hard in the coming weeks and months to sharpen the appearance of polarized worldviews – so as to give the voters a reason to vote for them rather than vote for the other groups – but the coming election will not be about policies, it will be about the following three things:

A. Math – the way the parties assess their chance of having a successful round of voting. That is the reason for the current timing.

B. Personalities – the person that Israelis would like to see as the next Prime Minister, and the people they’d like to see at the top.

C. Belonging – which camp the voters feel more comfortable with, and more at home with.

2.

Let’s talk first about B – personalities, especially the one of the Prime Minister: Netanyahu has been Israel’s Prime Minister for a very long time. Quite possibly too long. Public support in him is somewhat in decline (take a look at the latest Haaretz poll), and this could have been a reasonable opening for a serious challenger to be able to really test him. Many voters, surely on the left but also on the right, are tired of Bibi, and would gladly shop around for a “new car smell”, to borrow an expression from President Obama. If there is such a car to be found, though, it is more likely to be found to Netanyahu’s right, not to his left. Naftali Bennett is the new car that makes the PM worried. The opposition to his left doesn’t have a car – it has barely a carriage. So the voters are likely to stick with Netanyahu (it is elections, so I am obligated to issue the usual warning: surprises are always possible).   

3.

Do the math (our poll trends tracker can help you): the right is expected to get enough mandates with which to have a choice of several potential coalitions. It is most likely going to choose to have one with the Haredi parties (I’ll explain why later). The Haredi parties are angry with Netanyahu because of what happened in the last two years – his supposed “abandonment” of the alliance with them and his supposed cooperation with what they consider an anti-Haredi agenda. So theoretically, the Haredis can still decide to ditch Netanyahu and help the center-left form a coalition. Except that A. the center-left doesn’t really have an agreed-upon figure that the public trusts to be the Prime Minister, and, more importantly, B. the Haredis never form a coalition with the left when they have the key to forming the coalition. Haredi parties only go with the left-of-center coalition when the left-of-center bloc has a 61 plus majority that can prevent the right from forming a coalition. Currently, a 61 seat bloc seems unreachable.

Of course, things can change, both for the bloc and for the Haredi parties. But Haredis tend to be traditional, so I’d be surprised if they change their, well, traditions. Haredi leaders are in stormy waters when they start flirting with the idea of a left-of-center bloc. They risk losing their right-of-center voters.

4.

What do I mean by “belonging”? In every election, people vote by social affinity. If you are a secular Tel Avivian, you are likely to vote for the parties that your friends vote for (center, left, secular). If you live in a settlement, you are also likely to vote for someone that speaks the language you speak and is from the same environment. There is nothing new about this in this election – except that since the real ideological differences between the parties are so small, the social considerations become more pronounced. After all, a voter must somehow decide whom to vote for – and if all parties say they believe in more or less the same things, the only way for the voter to make a decision is to pick the party that looks like him and talks like him. The result will be a Knesset of many mid-size factions of more or less the same size. My colleague Tal Schneider called it not long ago “the twelve tribes scenario”. A good, catchy name, even if the number of sizable tribes is likely to be a little less than twelve.

5.

I know that some readers might take issue with my view that the differences between the parties are not great, so let me clarify and amend this argument: there are great differences between Merertz of the left and the right wing of the Habayit Hayehudi party. But neither is likely to head the next coalition. Thinking about the more likely main building blocks of the next coalition – Likud, Labor, Yesh Atid, Lieberman, Kahlon, even the Bennett faction of Habayit Hayehudi – I just don’t see a great difference.

The differences are mostly differences in style. The right is blunter with its nationalistic messages, the left is blunter with its calls for engagement and negotiations and equality. The current debate over the nation-state law is a good example: all parties support a Jewish-democratic state, all support equality for all citizens. The debate is over few nuances that aren’t likely to make much practical difference. And yet both sides have an interest to present their differences as ones between “fascism” (an expression attributed by some opponents to the proponents) and “disloyalty” (an expression attributed by some proponents to the opponents).

6.

On one issue the next coalition might be very different, and this is an issue that for world Jewry is high on the agenda but for many Israelis is much lower on the agenda: that is, religious affairs. If the coalition of old – right plus religious – is coming back, then one could expect a more conservative approach to religious affairs and a policy that is less considerate of progressive sensitivities.

Examples: the new conversion arrangement is not likely to hold; the Haredi draft arrangements will be amended and lose steam; if the close-to-finalized agreement on the Western Wall arrangement is not done by election day, chances are that it might have to wait several more years. That is the price of giving more power to the Haredi parties – a price that Netanyahu seems willing to pay in exchange for political stability.

7.

The main asset that the Haredi parties bring to the table is political stability. These are sectoral parties. Give them what they want – money for Yeshivas, control of the rabbinate, child-rearing subsidies, exemption from military service, etc. – and they’ll be the most loyal coalition partners. The heads of Haredi parties do not vie to become Prime Ministers, so they have no interest in getting stronger at the expense of the ruling party. All they want is their interests taken care of. For a Prime Minister with a full plate and a lot to worry about, such a simple formula of cooperation is a lot easier than the one offered by the ambitious Bennett, Lapid, and Livni. 

8.

There was something refreshing about the current coalition when it was formed. It had promise, but it failed to deliver much. Why? I think it’s mostly for one reason: the ambition of the leaders of Yesh Atid and Habayit Hayehudi. Many of the voters were initially satisfied with the prospect of having a center that includes religious and secular, urban and settler, hawkish (but not too scary) and dovish (but still realistic). But you can’t hold such a union with two leaders such as Lapid and Bennett – two young leaders who constantly think about becoming Prime Minister, and about how to make sure that the other guy doesn’t benefit from a union more than they do.

9.

Bennett is the only party leader that should be eager to have new elections. His ascendance is remarkable, but his real test will only come in the next round. Lapid failed because Netanyahu tricked him into getting the unforgiving job of finance Minister, and because Lapid failed to understand that the rules in the big league are different. He thought he was still a columnist with a knack for what the public feels – when the public started feeling that the job is too big for his abilities. Bennett has not really been tested. He got a job that the public doesn’t really understand (Minister of Commerce) and could invest a lot of his time in airing his refreshingly-daring-sounding views without having any responsibility for the consequences. If he wins big in three months or so, a more serious test will come.  And as Lapid can tell him, a fall can be even quicker than a rise.

10.

All Israeli polls are problematic. The system was changed – the threshold of entrance to the Knesset moved up to 3.25% (from 2.5%) of the vote – but both the parties and the public have not yet digested this change. Several parties, notably all the Arab parties, will have to merge or risk elimination. Voters will have to understand that the new rules mean that three projected seats in the polls mean nothing. Tzipi Livni’s Hatnuah, which is around 4 in the polls, could barely pass the test or disappear. Hatnuah voters will have to internalize the dilemma: insist on voting Livni and you might lose your vote, or ditch Livni and contribute to her disappearance from the scene.

Surely, Livni has no plans to be ditched. She is looking for a political deal with another party. Similarly, Kahlon’s new party is still in search of the ideal list of candidates, Lapid will have to decide who stays and who goes, and Bennett can add new members to his team and has to decide what to do with the more extreme faction of his list. All this means that what we see in today’s polls is an incomplete picture: we don’t have the exact list of parties and candidates that will be running. When we do, the voters might see things differently and could rapidly amend their preferences. Netanyahu understands that – it is a risk that he is taking in tilting towards new elections, because he believes that things will get even more complicated in the coming months.