Iran: Sanctions and the Risk of Breakout
May 4, 2013
May 3, 2013
Number 05/13 #01
This Update features two important articles on the state of play regarding the Iranian nuclear standoff – one looking at the effectiveness of current sanctions and another examining Iran’s calculations, and especially what considerations might lead Teheran to stage a nuclear breakout. It also contains an important article on the growing and increasingly controversial role being played by the small country of Qatar in various Middle East conflicts and issues.
First up is discussion of the sanctions issue from two Iranian-born Canadian academic experts, Sara Akrami & Saeed Ghasseminejad. They argue that the key to improving the effectiveness of sanctions is targeting the key decision-maker in Iran on nuclear issues – Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei. They note that Khamanei controls a large number of identifiable funds and enterprises, and he uses the funds and economic and social power he gets from this role to buy loyalty and political power, and that therefore efforts to directly target these funds and enterprises through sanctions are likely to be the most effective way to influence his calculations. For the rest of their argument, CLICK HERE. Meanwhile, commenting on Akrami and Ghasseminejad’s point and offering some additional advice on how to make sanctions more effective was noted author and pundit on the Iranian nuclear issue Emanuele Ottolenghi.
Next up is a longer piece offering detailed analysis on Iranian thinking in the context of the current state of the nuclear standoff from top Israeli strategic analyst Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall. Looking at a large variety of Iranian and non-Iranian sources, Segall examines what Iran has been saying and doing during and in the wake of the failed nuclear talks in Almaty, Kazakistan last month. He comes to the conclusion that Iran already has the technological capability to build nuclear weapons, appears to have no intention of giving up its military nuclear efforts, and is now merely seeking to ascertain the right moment to stage a “breakout” into full nuclear weapons capability. For Segal’s detailed but alarming analysis in full, CLICK HERE. Another interesting analysis of Iran’s history of systematic deception regarding its nuclear program comes from Israeli nuclear technology expert Lt. Col. (Res.) Dr. Rafael Ofek.
Finally, top flight American journalist Jeffrey Goldberg examines the bizarre double game which the tiny but wealthy Persian Gulf state of Qatar has been playing. Goldberg notes that Qatar gives money to Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and possibly extremist groups among the Syrian opposition, while also hosting a major US airbase, funding mainstream US thinktanks and this week, orchestrating an apparent slight softening of the Arab League peace plan (for more on this see Ahron Shapiro’s post on the subject, as linked below). Goldberg explores some of the drivers behind the seemingly inconsistent policy of Qatar’s ruling al-Thani family – one important one being that this increasingly important Mideast actor is “essentially an attention-starved teenager, whose emotional insecurity causes it to insert itself into everyone’s business.” For this very valuable look at a puzzling yet important Middle East wildcard, CLICK HERE. Also, a look at why the Qatari role in the Arab peace plan initiative may have made Israeli PM Netanyahu wary came from blogger Seth Mandel.
Readers may also be interested in:
- Israel concludes that it was Iran which sent a drone to attempt to penetrate Israeli airspace last week for unknown purposes.
- A look at what we have learned from a case in Cyprus about how Hezbollah attempts to target Israelis abroad.
- Israeli Arab writer Khaled Abu Toameh explains why it is wrong to blame Israel for the lack of Palestinian elections, while American commentator Abe Katsman explains why blaming Israel – or the US – for the fall of Palestinian PM Salam Fayyad is also incorrect.
- Former US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker warns the situation there now looks dangerously like it is spinning back into civil war.
- A look at the prospects for survival of the Jordanian monarchy in the wake of recent Middle East upheaval from noted expert on Jordan Prof. Asher Susser.
- Isi Leibler writes about problems with distribution of compensation to Holocaust survivors.
- Some examples from the many stories and comments now appearing at AIJAC’s daily “Fresh AIR” blog:
- Ahron Shapiro writes about the much-ballyhooed supposed changes to the Arab League peace plan this week – and points out they are less than meets the eye.
- Daniel Meyerowitz-Katz had three posts (here, here and here) detailing the explosion of ugly antisemitism (and then the further descent into a bigot versus bigot slanging match of hate) that erupted on a Facebook page set up by Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) advocates to organised a protest against a Max Brenner chocolate shop at the University of New South Wales – and explored what this tells us about the BDS movement.
- Sharyn Mittelman discusses a new documentary which reveals the reality of the “millionaires of Gaza.”
- Or Avi-Guy looks at the growing popularity of ANZAC day in Israel.
Sara Akrami & Saeed Ghasseminejad
National Post, 13/04/29
Iran’s continuing progress toward a nuclear bomb should have made it clear to the West that the current sanctions regime simply isn’t going to cut it. When it comes to the nuclear program there are two important decision makers: the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader. While there has been some progress in targeting the IRGC with sanctions, Khamenei himself has yet to received much attention from the international community.
He certainly warrants such attention. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei controls an substantial portion of the Iranian economy through his various holdings and foundations. The most notable foundations directly controlled by him are Imam Khomeini Foundation, Mostazafan Foundation, Abdolazim Shrine, and Astan Qods. The heads of these foundations are directly appointed by the Supreme Leader and therefore, they do not pay tax, and they cannot be audited by the parliament or by the judiciary system. They operate as personal properties of Khamenei, outside the normal structure of the Iranian state.
An examination of Imam Khomeini Foundation provides insight into the vast size and wealth of the Supreme Leader’s financial empire. Based on a statement by one of its officials, in September 2008, the Foundation owned about $45-billion in real estate assets. Imam Khomeini Foundation owns 36 firms in the Tehran stock exchange, through only one of its many holdings. It also owns the Iran Telecommunication Company, in partnership with the IRGC ,which is itself worth billions of dollars. This foundation is active in many profitable sectors of Iran’s economy, such as telecommunication, oil, gas, food and mining. It also does business outside the country. Last summer, for example, the Tadbir Development Company, which is owned by the Imam Khomeini Foundation, tried to buy French refinery La Petite Couronne.
The other foundations mentioned above are also wealthy, powerful, and influential and have vast economic interests both inside and outside Iran. Mostazafan Foundation was famous for its dominant role in Iran’s economy until a decade ago. While not quite as powerful today, it still has enormous wealth and plays an important role in Iran’s economy. Astan Qods owns almost the entire northeastern part of Iran. Abdolazim shrine, located near Tehran, is controlled by Iran’s former Minister of Intelligence, Mohammad ReyShahri. It has concentrated its economic activities in the Rey Group, which is run by a group of former high-rank intelligence officials and has interests in several industries, such as oil, gas, construction, food, and agriculture. As a matter of fact, the Rey Group is the official dealership of BMW in Iran, which makes Iran’s Supreme Leader, Iran’s supreme fine German automobile dealer, as well.
It has taken Khamenei decades to accumulate this wealth and position himself and his holdings at the heart of Iran’s commercial life. Now that the fortune has been amassed, he uses the money to buy loyalty both inside and outside of Iran. Targeting his financial empire will diminish his political power. Therefore, including his companies and their managers on the sanction list will put a tremendous pressure on him.
Recently, Canada took a significant step by closing the Iranian Embassy and including the Qods Force, the external branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, to its terrorist list. Although economic sanctions have put pressure on Iran’s economy and therefore its political leaders, the international community, especially Western powers, should recognize that Iran’s Supreme Leader is the key decision maker in the country’s affairs and in its nuclear program. If the West truly wants to add some bite to its sanctions program before Iran builds its first nuclear bomb, directly targeting the Supreme Leader’s commercial holdings is a good next step.
Sara Akrami is a political science student at York University in Toronto. Saeed Ghasseminejad is a finance PhD candidate at the City University of New York. Both were born in Iran.
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Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 9
1 May 2013
- Iran already has the necessary technological capability to produce at least one nuclear bomb. Iran is actually a short way from the red line, and crossing it is a matter of deciding. Under current geostrategic conditions, it does not appear that Iran intends to give up its nuclear activity; instead, it is waiting for the right moment to “break out.”
- Iran is positioning itself as a leading regional actor and emphasizes its lack of dependence on external actors in energy, military, economic, and other areas. As Iran assesses that, given the regional changes, the traditional tools (terror, subversion, export of the revolution) will no longer suffice to promote its goals of regional hegemony and guaranteeing its survival, Iran is drawing closer to a decision on going nuclear.
- It draws encouragement from the stance of Russia, which, as a member of the Security Council and hence of the 5+1 group, helps Iran by thwarting any unified Western position on either the nuclear or Syrian issues.
- For Iran, the passage of time means there will no longer be a need for negotiations. Iran will continue its foot-dragging tactics, hinting to the West that it has to wait until the election results, and the formation of a new government, before continuing the nuclear talks (even though the government has no real say on the nuclear issue).
- The West, for its part, will apparently go along and wait for another “last opportunity,” and the futile dance that has gone on for a decade will continue without any Western successes and with Iranian technological accomplishments that bring it ever closer to its goal.
Iran Getting Closer to Military Nuclear Capability
In April, Iran celebrated its National Nuclear Day just after the failed second round of nuclear talks with the 5+1 group in Almaty, Kazakhstan. The talks’ failure again revealed the dead-end reached by the present Iranian-Western nuclear negotiations channel. It also once again demonstrated that there are actually two parallel processes in motion.
On one side is Iran’s foot-dragging in the talks – the first round in Kazakhstan was held after almost a year’s intermission – and their repeated failure; on the other is Iran’s ongoing progress in developing its technological capabilities in the nuclear domain. This progress is bringing Iran close to a point where it will be able to achieve its goal of a military nuclear capability. It will do so when it chooses, subject to the full range of its strategic political considerations, which are a main component of the decision-making process in Tehran – especially in light of the changes in the geostrategic environment and its assessments of threats and opportunities.
All Options on the Table
The West is mainly pressuring Iran through sanctions on its oil industry, exacting a high price in the form of considerably reduced exports and revenue. Tehran, for its part, is pressuring the West through persistent technological progress in the critical aspects of its nuclear program – regarding both uranium enrichment (involving mining, conversion, enrichment, and apparently also the military components of its nuclear program) and plutonium (involving heavy-water enrichment at its IR-40 reactor in Arak). In this way Iran displays a symmetrical response to the West’s “all options on the table” declarations.
Iran is thereby signaling that if the West refuses to honor its key demand for recognition of its “legitimate right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” it will enact this right itself, deploying the issue of 20-percent enrichment as an example.
Rights and Sanctions
After the first round of nuclear talks in Kazakhstan, Iran expressed optimism about the talks’ future. However, after a further meeting in Turkey and the second round in Kazakhstan, it put the onus for failure on the West, while repeatedly stressing the need to recognize its right to nuclear energy and to remove the sanctions. The chairman of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the Majlis, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, asserted that in the “nuclear game, Iran has achieved all its goals including enrichment and nuclear knowledge, while the West has not achieved its goal – stopping Iran’s enrichment, so Iran is the winner of the nuclear game and the Western states will be forced one day to accept the nuclear reality in Iran.”2 He also reiterated that “Achievement of nuclear rights is Iran’s strategic and permanent policy, and its guidelines as specified by Khamenei, and the path of its progress will not come to a halt or be altered due to the change of government” (after the presidential election in Iran on June 14). He reiterated, “The leaders of the negotiating countries, especially the Americans, should know that Iran’s nuclear dossier and elections are two separate issues.” Boroujerdi advised the U.S. and other world powers negotiating with Tehran not to wait for the results of the June presidential election, and said that would be a “mistaken calculation.”3
Abbas Araqchi, Deputy Foreign Minister and a member of the negotiating team, revealed, “The Iranian delegation in the talks was ready to continue negotiations until a final agreement was reached, but it was the opposite side (the 5+1 group) that apparently lacked the necessary readiness and permission from their capitals.” He added that the 5+1 paused the negotiations, anticipating a possible change in Tehran’s nuclear stance following the upcoming June presidential elections, and stressed that Tehran’s position is irrevocable and is not influenced by domestic politics. Araqchi concluded by saying that Iran was ready to move on two paths to strike a deal with the 5+1. The first involves continued talks in the form of step-by-step, confidence-building measures, which is the 5+1’s choice but is long and time-consuming. The other path is a shortcut, in which the world powers recognize Iran’s “legitimate rights, especially uranium enrichment, avoiding hostile moves, and lifting sanctions to reach results rapidly.” He further added that Iran was ready to move on either path, although it prefers the second option. He expressed the hope that the 5+1 would grasp a correct understanding of Iran’s proposals and return to the talks with a positive approach.4
Just as in previous failed rounds Iran threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Boroujerdi said that if the West did not show a commitment to such issues as cutting back on nuclear weapons and did not recognize Iran’s nuclear rights, the Majlis would again consider the option of scrapping the NPT.
Iran does not accept that it must respect the provisions of the NPT, while America and the West may ignore Article 65 and Article 4.6 Boroujerdi continued: “In such a case, there is no longer any reason for Iran to be a member of the NPT, and the Majlis can review this matter….We cannot be indifferent to the pressure the Iranian nation is facing; of course, this is a strategic decision that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) must adopt, but the Majlis will use all of its abilities to defend the rights of the nation.”7
Iran and the West
The Iranian press plays an important role in covering the nuclear talks and preparing public opinion for a possible confrontation with the West over the nuclear program. Generally, there is a certain consistency between the words of the leadership and the nuclear negotiators, on the one hand, and editorials in the Iranian press, on the other.
After the talks failed, an editorial in the newspaper Jomhouri Eslami – headlined “Wherein Lies the Problem of the Nuclear Talks?” – shed light on Iran’s stance, its rationale for its conduct, and its propaganda line during the talks: “The main question is wherein lies the obstacle in the talks between Iran and the West that have not succeeded to remove [this obstacle] after ten rounds? To find a convincing answer to these questions, it is important to pay attention to two issues: the sanctions and the interpretation of the right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”
The editorial continued, stating that the sides’ positions on these issues precluded reaching minimal agreement in past talks, and it does not appear likely that future talks can succeed unless the impediments are removed. The Western states and the 5+1 countries are, for their own reasons, imposing economic sanctions on Iran whose purpose is to change the behavior and positions of the government and the people. Khamenei in his recent speech in Mashhad referred to this objective, which involves pressuring the regime by creating a rift between it and the people. Presumably, those imposing the sanctions think they must keep doing so until they achieve the goals they have set. That is, so long as the West does not see the Iranian people capitulate, it will continue on its path. Thus, during the two rounds of talks in Almaty, the Western side stressed the need to continue the talks but did not agree to cancel or diminish the sanctions; the Iranian team, for its part, did not accept the West’s demands.
A further issue is the two sides’ differing interpretations of the right to nuclear energy. The Iranian side maintains that Iran’s NPT membership, and the fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can supervise its nuclear facilities, means its nuclear activity is for peaceful purposes. Hence, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council has again underlined that the problem is not the percentage of enrichment but rather the acceptance of Iran’s basic right to atomic energy.
The 5+1 states view this right from a fundamentally different perspective. They do not see NPT membership and IAEA supervision as sufficient to prove the peaceful intentions of Iran’s nuclear activity, and they pose additional demands that cause disagreement and the talks’ inability to be fruitful. On this issue the Western states must abandon their strict interpretation of NPT membership and accept the regular practice, the editorial said.
Jomhouri Eslami summed up:
Arriving at a common interpretation of the right to nuclear activity and amending the method of using sanctions against Iran constitute the main key to ending the stalemate in the nuclear talks. But this is an optimistic viewpoint. Another viewpoint is that the West, and particularly the United States, are engaging in dual, ambiguous behavior in their nuclear policy, and the clear example of this is that they enable the Zionist regime to maintain hundreds of atomic warheads in the heart of the sensitive region of the Middle East while denying Iran even its legal right to nuclear activity for peaceful purposes! In light of this dual policy, it is impossible to give credence to the West.8
Hasin Shriatmadari, editor of Kayhan, which expresses the view of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, wrote on his website and in an editorial in the newspaper that the latest round of talks proves that “the West does not really want to reach a solution and is not sincere in its intentions toward Iran.” According to Shriatmadari, the failure does not stem from any lack of talent of the Iranian negotiating teams, but rather from the different goals each side wants to achieve. Iran, he suggests, is striving to prove that its nuclear program is meant for peaceful purposes, while the West is not really seeking to solve the nuclear issue but instead wants to leave it open so that it can continue its struggle against Iran and leave the sanctions in place. Shriatmadari adds that this situation – in effect, a closing of the nuclear file – actually constitutes an acknowledgment of Iran’s victory and steadfast position over the years. In conclusion, Shriatmadari proposes increasing the media presence at the talks so as to highlight the real intentions of the West.9
A Growing Awareness
The West, and especially the United States, is aware of Iran’s gradual progress toward a military nuclear capability despite the sanctions and the price they are exacting. American spokespersons have emphasized this capability in hearings before the Senate Intelligence Committee. Particularly notable is the testimony of National Intelligence Director James R. Clapper, who on March 1210 and again on April 18 addressed the status of Iran’s nuclear program and its regional aspirations:
Iran continues to develop technical expertise in uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors, weaponization and ballistic missiles, from which it could draw if it decides to build missile-deliverable weapons, nuclear weapons. Clearly, Tehran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to produce them, so the central issue is its political will to do so. Such a decision, we believe, will be made by the Supreme Leader, and at this point we don’t know if he’ll eventually decide to build nuclear weapons. In Iran, leaders are exploiting the unrest in the Arab world to spread influence and to undermine the United States and our allies. But Tehran also faces a worsening financial outlook in the fall of the Assad regime and Syria would be a huge strategic loss for Iran….Russia will continue to resist putting more international pressure on Syria or Iran.11
National Nuclear Day
Those words are consistent with Iran’s accelerating nuclear activity on the ground, in blatant defiance of the West. It is indicative that Iran’s National Nuclear Day (April 9) came right after the second round of nuclear talks in Almaty (April 6-7). It is unlikely that the relevant actors in the West even noticed the proximity of these dates and the propaganda trap that Iran had laid for them.
National Nuclear Day offered a convenient stage for Iran’s leaders and the heads of its nuclear program to highlight Iran’s achievements in the nuclear field and its independence in continuing the program without regard for Western concerns. Senior figures made much of this independence and the ability to make headway in the program, while lauding the technological advancements and propaganda value associated with the program. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – who apparently, as he reaches the end of his tenure, has been relieved of dealing with the nuclear issue – declared in a Nuclear Day speech that
the peoples of the world must be aware of the great potential that lies in nuclear energy in all areas of life and not allow the world’s wealth to be limited to any particular group of states [i.e., the West]….There are those who are interested in exclusive possession of this energy, the same ones who have produced a nuclear bomb themselves and acted against humanity, who seize ownership of the technologies, and also seek to prevent the Iranian people from gaining access to nuclear technology.
He emphasized that the Iranian people had stood firm and nevertheless attained such technology: “Can anyone deny us this? You [Western countries] made every effort to prevent Iran from going nuclear, but Iran did go nuclear, and now you are trying to take it away from Iran.”12
As part of the Nuclear Day events, Iran inaugurated some nuclear projects related to the uranium-enrichment process: uranium extraction from natural resources at the Saghand Uranium Complex in Ardakan, and an additional facility for uranium conversion, the Yellowcake Production Complex.13 The head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Fereydun Abbasi, affirmed that “Iran is looking for uranium resources to provide the fuel needs for its operating [nuclear] reactors or those set to be built in the future.”14
In a special interview for Nuclear Day, Abbasi noted Iran’s principal achievements in various fields. He stressed the installation of new generations of centrifuges,15 the ongoing uranium enrichment at levels of 3.5 percent and 20 percent that are required for operating Iran’s reactors, and the continuing R&D on even more advanced generations of centrifuges. These could enable Iran to enrich uranium at the nuclear-weapon level in a shorter time span. Abbasi likewise pointed to the ongoing preparations to activate the 40-megawatt heavy-water reactor that will also enable Iran to progress in its military nuclear program along the plutonium track.16
In interviews he gave subsequently, Abassi reemphasized that at present Iran indeed does not have plans to enrich uranium to a level above 20 percent. But if such a need arose in the future, “for example, for ships and submarines, if our researchers need to have a stronger underwater presence, we will have to make small engines that should be fueled by 45% to 56% enriched uranium….In that case, we might need this [highly enriched] fuel.”17 In a closed meeting, Abassi also updated the Majlis on the latest nuclear developments.18
The Revolutionary Guards: Destroy Tel Aviv and Haifa
On April 18, which was Iranian Army Day, spokesmen of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the army belittled Western threats that “all options are on the table,” saying this was propaganda for domestic purposes aimed at the media and public opinion in the United States and Israel. The spokesmen also warned against “stupid acts” by Israel (i.e., attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities) and again emphasized their readiness to carry out the Supreme Leader’s orders and annihilate Tel Aviv and Haifa should Iran be attacked.19 IRGC commander Mohammad Ali Jafari again warned that the security of the world’s energy reserves is in the IRGC’s hands and that “the enemies of the Islamic Revolution cannot ensure these sources” since the IRGC controls the main lanes for energy supplies in the Persian Gulf.20
The Nuclear Issue in Iran’s Elections
The nuclear issue is playing a leading role in Iran’s presidential race and is a focus of contenders’ claims and counterclaims. For example, one contender, Hasan Rowhani, a senior member of the Expediency Council (head of its Center for Strategic Research) and a former nuclear negotiator, observed critically that at the time he served as head of the negotiating team, Iran’s situation was much better and “the citizens can feel this difference and make the necessary comparison.” Rowhani pointed out that in those days Iran was not close to war, the Iranian nuclear file issue was nowhere near the Security Council, and no resolutions against Iran had been adopted.21
Another possible presidential contender, Ali Akbar Velayati, a former foreign minister who today serves as Khamenei’s adviser on international affairs, asserted that, in the past, “Iran had tried to suspend uranium-enrichment activities during both the reformist government and the present government at the Supreme Leader’s behest. However, the West did not act honestly toward Iran or respond to its demands.” In that period, he added, Iran had agreed to a suspension to prove to the world and the West, as well as the Iranian public, that retreating in the face of enemies, and of the West, is not effective. Therefore, according to the Leader’s decree, it was decided to continue Iran’s activity in the nuclear sphere within the framework of the NPT.22
At the same time, the failure of the latest round of talks, and the fact that a military clash with the West is becoming a real possibility, seems to be intensifying the domestic debates about continuing to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis. These debates, however, are not affecting Iran’s technological progress in the nuclear field, its growing defiance of the West, or the projection of its power toward its neighbors in the Gulf (particularly Bahrain).
Iran Nears the Moment of Decision
Iran already has the necessary technological capability to produce at least one nuclear bomb. Even if the reports are accurate that it has stopped uranium enrichment of 20 percent and not exceeded 250 kilograms of enriched uranium, which by Israeli assessments is the critical mass beyond which Iran could produce a bomb, thanks to its technological capabilities, Iran could in a short time enrich (possibly even clandestinely) the necessary amounts of uranium for a bomb. Iran is actually a short way from the red line, and crossing it is a matter of deciding.
Under current geostrategic conditions, it does not appear that Iran intends to give up its nuclear activity; instead, it is waiting for the right moment to “break out.” Iran has already made clear to the West that crossing the threshold is no longer a technological problem, just an issue of weighing considerations and reaching a decision. Iran is positioning itself as a leading regional actor and emphasizes its lack of dependence on external actors in energy, military, economic, and other areas.
Moreover, in the new Middle Eastern reality that is taking shape, Iran has a message for Arab states that are undergoing change: to follow the model of its own steadfast resilience against Western pressure since the outbreak of the revolution. It draws encouragement from the stance of Russia, which, as a member of the Security Council and hence of the 5+1 group, helps Iran by thwarting any unified Western position on either the nuclear or Syrian issues.
In the window of time that remains until Iran’s presidential elections, it does not appear that a breakthrough will occur in the negotiations. For Iran, the passage of time means there will no longer be a need for such negotiations. Iran will continue its foot-dragging tactics, hinting to the West that it has to wait until the election results, and the formation of a new government, before continuing the nuclear talks (even though the government has no real say on the nuclear issue). The West, for its part, will apparently go along and wait for another “last opportunity,” and the futile dance that has gone on for a decade will continue without any Western successes and with Iranian technological accomplishments that bring it ever closer to its goal.
In the environment taking shape in the overall Middle East after the upheavals of the “Arab Spring,” Iran is trying to position itself as the main power broker that can affect the course of events and reduce American influence and involvement in the region via Washington’s allies among the Gulf states, particularly Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Those two, especially Iran’s bitter Sunni rival Saudi Arabia, are gradually, with Western assistance, weakening Iran’s position in Syria, with all that entails for Iran’s continued ability to influence the Syrian-Lebanese arena and, from it, to project force toward Israel. Moreover, the strengthening of Islamist Sunni actors in the area adds more fuel to the Sunni-Shiite conflict, with Iran’s creation Hizbullah already deeply involved in the crisis on Syrian soil and suffering losses. In addition, Iran regards the growing Western military aid, particularly the missile-defense umbrellas for the Gulf States and Israel, and possibly also Turkey, as a mounting threat.
Iran perceives both external and domestic threats affecting the regime’s survivability, while also seeing a range of opportunities opened by the “Arab Spring” or “Islamic awakening,” as Iran calls it. Thus, Iran keeps developing its military nuclear program, bringing it close to the point where it would be able to assemble a nuclear bomb in a very short time – despite Western pressure and sanctions.
Both American and Iranian interests in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, in general, are undergoing processes of change that put them on a collision course. One side’s perceived threat is the other side’s perceived opportunity. In Iran’s view, leaving the nuclear file open is part of the U.S. strategy to contain Iran’s influence in the region, and Washington has no real interest in reaching a settlement. As that outlook gains strength in Iran, along with the assessment that, given the present circumstances and regional changes, the traditional tools (terror, subversion, export of the revolution) will no longer suffice to promote its goals of regional hegemony and guaranteeing its survival, Iran is drawing closer to a decision on going nuclear.
* * *
5. NPT Treaty, Article 6: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm
6. NPT Treaty, Article 4: “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.” http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm
13. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920120000052; http://news.irib.ir/NewsPage.aspx?newsid=28851
16. http://tinyurl.com/bqzgz6g (ISNA)
17. http://tinyurl.com/ceb3v62 (ISNA)
19. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13920129000221; http://www.mehrnews.com/detail/News/2035213; http://www.resalat-news.com/fa/?code=136943; http://www.kayhan.ir/920114/3.htm#other300; http://www.leader.ir/langs/fa/index.php?p=bayanat&id=10497
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