FPI Bulletin, April 14

Secretary of State John Kerry’s recent call for a “new arrangement” with Tehran to curb its ballistic missile program constitutes an admission that the U.N. resolution tied to the July 2015 nuclear deal has failed to stem Iran’s misbehavior. Rather than offer new concessions if Iran halts its missile launches, the White House should impose stronger economic sanctions aimed at compelling Iran’s compliance with longstanding international demands.
 
Over the past nine months, the Obama administration has repeatedly argued that the prohibition on Iranian ballistic missile development in U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231 constitutes a binding legal obligation. In a Senate hearing last July, Kerry falsely claimed that the resolution contains the “exact same language” as the ballistic missile proscription in UNSCR 1929 (2010). In fact, UNSCR 1929 employed compulsory language stating that Tehran “shall not” advance ballistic missile-related activity, whereas UNSCR 2231 states only that the regime is “called upon” to forgo such activity, indicating that Iran has no legal requirement to comply.
 
However, the two resolutions partially overlap, since UNSCR 2231 mandated that the restrictions in UNSCR 1929 would remain in effect until the nuclear deal’s Implementation Day, which arrived on January 16, 2016. Thus, Iran’s ballistic missile tests in October and November of last year flouted both the binding prohibitions in UNSCR 1929 and the non-binding injunctions in UNSCR 2231. Still, the U.N., backed by a White House fearful of antagonizing the regime, failed to act.
 
The day after Implementation Day, the Obama administration imposed unilateral U.S. sanctions targeting subsidiaries of companies that America had already sanctioned — a move that amounted to pinpricks. Furthermore, at a Senate hearing in February, Kerry told lawmakers that he opposed congressional action to impose further sanctions. “I wouldn’t welcome them at this moment in time,” he said, “given the fact that we’ve given them a warning, and if they decide to do another launch, then I think there’s a rationale.”
 
In March, Iran provided such a rationale by again testing ballistic missiles, demonstrating that the sanctions imposed in January had no deterrent effect. By this time, however, the binding restriction in UNSCR 1929 had expired, leaving only the non-binding prohibition in UNSCR 2231. Therefore, the United States and its European allies responded with a letter declaring the tests were “inconsistent with” UNSCR 2231, but they did not allege that Iran had actually violated the resolution. As Russian Ambassador to the U.N. Vitaly Churkin noted, “A call is different from a ban so legally you cannot violate a call, you can comply with a call or you can ignore the call, but you cannot violate a call. The legal distinction is there.”
 
At first, the administration denied the significance of the letter’s omission. In a Senate hearing last week, the State Department’s third-ranking official acknowledged that UNSCR 1929 and UNSCR 2231 contain contrasting language, but nevertheless contended that UNSCR 2231’s prohibition imposes a legal obligation. “For me, it’s a distinction without a difference,” said Under Secretary for Political Affairs Thomas Shannon. “From my point of view, 2231 is telling Iran that it should not be undertaking any activity related to ballistic missiles, and that’s how we act.” In reality, the U.N.’s inaction indicated that the difference carried profound practical implications.
 
In the context of these developments, Kerry’s plea for a “new arrangement” with Iran over ballistic missiles belies the administration’s misleading rhetoric on ballistic missiles since the nuclear deal’s finalization. It also reflects the White House’s failure to learn the lessons of Iran’s continuing defiance both of the U.N. and of U.S. law. By ignoring his own pledges to meaningfully punish Tehran for its provocations, President Obama has incentivized the regime to continue them.
 
For this reason, it should come as no surprise that the Islamist regime quickly rejected Kerry’s overture. After all, Iran no longer faces a binding obligation to refrain from ballistic missile development. And thanks to the nuclear agreement itself, the regime has acquired not only billions of dollars in sanctions relief, but also the right to pursue an internationally recognized and large-scale nuclear program after the bulk of the deal’s restrictions expire in 10 to 15 years.
 
Rather than provide Iran with additional concessions in exchange for a “new arrangement,” the administration and Congress should seize this opportunity to reinvigorate the sanctions that still remain in place and pressure the regime to cease its ballistic missile activities, weapons purchases, and regional aggression. Kerry has finally admitted that UNSCR 2231 fails to definitively prohibit Iran’s development of ballistic missiles. The United States should not further reward Iran for its dangerous behavior.

Following a protracted process with numerous twists and turns, Russia finally appears to have begun delivering at least some elements of the S-300 long-range air-defense system to Iran. On April 11, exactly one year after President Vladimir Putin lifted his ban on such deliveries, a convoy of ships offloaded large equipment at the Caspian port of Anzali, under a heavy guard that included extensive deployment of Iranian air-defense reinforcements. The equipment was then transported by road to Tehran. Amateur photographs and videos suggest that the cargo included parts of the S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A Gargoyle) air-defense system. Even if upgraded, the system has lower capabilities than the PMU-2 version Tehran was originally believed to purchase, but it still represents a potentially formidable boost to the country’s air-defense network.

In 2007, Iran and Russia signed an $800 million contract for around five S-300 battalions (or sixty launchers), with deliveries to begin in 2008. Yet the fulfilment phase was delayed and later cancelled after the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1929 in 2010 banning all weapons deliveries to Iran.

This week, however, photos have shown large flatbed trucks in Iran transporting what appear to be partially camouflaged components of the ST68U/UM Tin Shield and 64N6E Big Bird search-and-acquisition radars associated with the older PMU-1 version, in addition to other unidentified equipment. So far, none of the available imagery shows the fire-control radars or missile transporter erector launchers (TELs) associated with a complete S-300 firing unit. Even so, the radars that have been sent could be used in a standalone mode to enhance Iran’s situational awareness if the launchers and missiles are delayed or not delivered for whatever reason. PMU-1 components are also compatible with systems delivered to Iran years ago by Belarus, such as the 30N6 radar.

The S-300PMU-1 was introduced to Russian service in the early 1990s and has since been supplanted by two newer generations. It is not yet known if the systems delivered to Iran have received any major upgrades beyond standard refurbishment following their gradual replacement in Russian service with the S-400. In 2011, Russia ended production of S-300PMUs in favor of the three-tier S-400 Triumph system, which has double the range and capabilities. S-400 production began in 2010, but so far Moscow has only exported the system to one country (China) due to its own still-substantial domestic demand. S-400s have also been deployed to Syria to protect Russian forces there.

In 2014, the arms company Almaz-Antey accelerated delivery of S-400s to the Russian military, which has so far received nine complete “regiments” (each regiment is three battalions). This has meant that additional secondhand S-300s could be made surplus for delivery to Iran. Meanwhile, Tehran reportedly refused Moscow’s past proposal to deliver the more modern Antey 2500 (S-300V) system because it did not want to retrain its air-defense operators.

Despite being an older generation, the S-300PMU-1 can still detect up to 100 aerial targets simultaneously at a 300 km range, and engage six of them. It can be armed with 48N6 interceptor missiles that have a range of 150 km against aerial targets and 40 km against ballistic missile targets, reaching an altitude of 10 to 27 km. Each S-300PMU-1 battalion can combine up to four batteries with three launchers each, using a shared 64N6E acquisition radar supported by a 54K6E command post.

Previously, S-300PMU-1s have been exported to Cyprus, Greece, and Slovakia, among other countries. In spring 2015, the Israeli air force reportedly gained valuable experience operating against the system during joint maneuvers with Greece.

If the full delivery of S-300 components is completed as expected, the system will significantly improve Iran’s air-defense capability once it eventually enters service. To effectively cover such a large country, however, Iran will still need to integrate the S-300s with its modified S-200 and Raad surface-to-air missiles, and perhaps with the Bavar-373, a system that is claimed to be under development in Iran loosely based on the S-300 design.

Farzin Nadimi is a Washington-based analyst specializing in the security and defense affairs of Iran and the Persian Gulf region.