Fresh Air

Today’s AIJAC Iran war update once again brings you rare and exclusive interviews, fresh analysis and commentary from Hebrew Israeli media.

Today’s update includes:

• On “Good Morning Israel” on Army Radio, Danny Citrinowicz, former head of the Iran branch in the Research Division of the Intelligence Directorate and fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) says that any ceasefire does not really solve the Iranian dilemma, since it has no intention of giving up on its goal to destroy Israel.
• The former commander of the Israeli Air and Missile Force Brig. Gen. (Res.) Ran Kochav, who also served as an IDF spokesperson, tells Kan Reshet Bet (Radio) that the fact that Iran is continuing to fire missiles even after the ceasefire is par for the course for the Islamist regime.
• Finally, on the news website Walla, Mohammad Frej – director of the “Tza’ad – Trust-Building Communication” program and an expert in understanding Islamic consciousness in an era of global conflict – explains the mentality of the Iranian Shi’ite regime’s zealous animosity towards Israel, and why it is the key to developing a strategy for combatting it.

‘The Iranians are trying to create a consciousness of victory’
Good Morning Israel
Army Radio
June 24, 2025

Efi Triger: Danny Citrinowicz, former head of the Iran branch in the Research Division of the Intelligence Directorate, today a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, INSS. Shalom to you.

Danny Citrinowicz: Good morning, Efi, to you and the listeners.

Efi Triger: How do you analyse the last few hours, including that announcement by Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s Foreign Minister, that “we fired until the last minute,” and of course the barrages that came after that?

Danny Citrinowicz: Yes, certainly. As was said before, the Iranians are trying to create a consciousness of victory. I would not underestimate it. It’s true that Israel has very significant achievements, but in the end, this consciousness of victory is also expressed in the fact that Iran will not give up, and will continue to also rebuild both its conventional power and its nuclear power. And therefore, I think that no matter what happens now with the ceasefire, the Iranian problem is not behind us, because the Israeli dilemma is still in place. That is, assuming we see the Iranians return to rebuild their power, and that will happen.

As a matter of course, this is one of the central lessons the Iranians will take from this campaign, and they will need to rebuild their capabilities, perhaps even in the nuclear field, we will need to think and see how we continue to damage Iranian capabilities without getting into an attritional campaign, out of a clear understanding that the ability to reach another bad agreement with Iran is almost non-existent if the other side is not willing to listen. And therefore, certainly there are significant achievements, but it has not brought Iran to its knees, at least not in the Iranian perception, and therefore the problems are still ahead of us.

Efi Triger: Yes, and when you talk, of course, about the fact that we still don’t know what they will do, or that they will continue to strive to rebuild their power, according to a report that just came out in the Washington Post, the basis for the ceasefire came following talks between Iranian officials and the Trump administration, where they made it clear that they would return to the negotiating table and discuss their nuclear program. Meaning, we are returning to that eternal round of negotiations, even though, of course, Iran is much weaker.

Danny Citrinowicz: We are returning to square one. We must remember that from the beginning, the Iranians refused to return to the negotiating table, in the sense that they would not return as long as Israel continued its activities against them. And therefore, we need to really see, the story of returning to negotiations is not the central story. I don’t know how willing the Iranians will be to make concessions against the backdrop of the damage they suffered to their nuclear program.

For now, it seems that maybe the Iranians will show more flexibility, but they will certainly not give up their right to enrichment. We see this as a common thread from the Supreme Leader down to the political elite. And therefore, in the end, the renewal of negotiations is perhaps a good thing, but I am not sure that we will see a weakened Iran surrender, at least according to its statements. But we must remember that this is on the nuclear issue. On the conventional aspects, there is nothing to talk about. The Iranians will go and rebuild their power without any connection, because that is how the regime sees itself, its power, and its capabilities. And therefore, our challenges are significant in that regard.

Efi Triger: Significant and still valid. If I analyse your words, if you were in the closed-door discussion room today, you would say, “Folks, don’t stop, strive to topple the regime”?

Danny Citrinowicz: I think Israel’s ability to strive for or cause the toppling of the regime is very low. It’s not that the regime doesn’t have legitimacy problems, that must be said. But for the time being, at least it seems for now that the public in Iran perceives the campaign more as against Iran and not against the regime itself. And even if the regime were to weaken, there is really no one to replace it in Iran. And Israel’s ability to do this by aerial means is limited. It must be said, if the Americans joined us, it would be something else.

But the idea of toppling the regime in the foreseeable future is an idea that may be logical from a strategic point of view, but practically it is almost impossible to achieve. And therefore, Israel needs to do what it is doing now, as it is quite clear that we do not have significantly better leverages than the current situation. That is, we need to see how Iran behaves, we need to work with the United States to try to reach a better agreement.

But whoever thinks that we can conduct a simple military campaign against Iran, that every time they rearm we will attack in Iran, is mistaken. Because the Iranians, unlike Hezbollah, unlike Hamas, will respond to these attacks and we will find ourselves again in a war of attrition. And therefore, we need to understand that a political agreement with American backing against the Iranians is critical to leveraging the significant achievements that the State of Israel has in this campaign.

Efi Triger: What is clear is that even if there is a ceasefire now, it is more in the format of “quiet will be met with quiet,” and not a signed agreement.

Danny Citrinowicz: Unequivocally, and that is why the situation is so unstable. Again, I don’t know if the ceasefire will hold against the backdrop of the difficult event in Be’er Sheva. We don’t know how the next few hours will develop. But even if we assume that the ceasefire will hold, it does not solve, in my opinion, Israel’s list of problems with the Iranians. Because the Iranians, despite the significant achievements, and there are significant achievements both in the nuclear field and in intelligence, the Iranians have no intention of giving up, and therefore the dilemmas are still far from over. There is still no strategy, at least that I am aware of, that will ultimately allow Israel to preserve the achievements and deepen them, without reaching a war of attrition.

This Morning, with Aryeh Golan
Kan Reshet Bet
June 24, 2025

Aryeh Golan: Shalom to Brigadier General (Res.) Ran Kochav, a former IDF spokesperson and also a former commander of the Air Defence. These missiles were the last barrage, as you understand it? Because Iranian television is now announcing that after four barrages, and they were destructive and they were deadly, the ceasefire has begun. Can we rely on that?

Ran Kochav: The Persians are practicing an ancient Arab custom here of having the last word. This is true in Lebanon and in Gaza and to a certain extent also with the Houthi Shiites. And we will yet see if this is the final chord, even if Iranian television says so. And indeed, there will be more critical days and hours to come. I’m not saying this to calm things down, nor to cause alarm. I think that nothing is over until it’s over, and I am not convinced that these are the final moments of the Iran war.

Aryeh Golan: Does the announcement that the ceasefire on Iran’s part takes effect at 7 AM make sense to you? They were supposed to start the ceasefire, let’s hope they will start after seven, almost half an hour ago, and we only in the evening? Is such a thing even possible?

As we speak, I unfortunately must report a fourth fatality being extracted from the bomb shelter that sustained a deadly hit in Be’er Sheva. So, four killed in this strike. The question is really if Israel can continue to attack in Iran when Iran is already in a ceasefire. Have you ever heard of such a ceasefire?

Ran Kochav: Look, regarding the hours, there is a half-hour time difference between us and the Iranians. 7:30 for them is 7 o’clock for us. They are east of us, so there is a time difference. I don’t know if this is relevant to the question, to the issue, or against it, but it’s a fact. And look, a ceasefire to the minute is never… in the history of Israel’s wars, it doesn’t always stick to the clock. There is always some “emptying of magazines,” here it’s not magazines, it’s launchers, in the last moments, trying to kill a few more of the enemy. Trying to achieve the last gain. This is true in many of the recent cases, both against terror organizations and against a large country like Iran. And the issue of Persian pride, and I think also their desire for a certain response that they gave yesterday towards the Americans.

Aryeh Golan: And President Trump’s announcement, he thanked the Iranians for informing him in advance that they were going to attack. That’s something that is not pleasant for Iranian ears to hear.

Ran Kochav: It’s not pleasant for Iranian ears to hear, but it’s also, as I understand it – especially after this morning – not pleasant for our ears to hear, because we are the ones who paved the way to Tehran in many ways, both operationally and in order to involve the Americans. And if there is an Iranian response against Americans, almost a coordinated response, including evacuating bases, and one last barrage that causes us casualties and deaths, and you just mentioned the fourth fatality, that is certainly not something pleasant or comfortable.

But I’m trying to zoom out for a moment from this difficult morning. But the bottom line, even if it’s hard to say it this morning, our geostrategic situation, in many ways, is much better after these 12 days. It’s not certain we are finished with the Iranian nuclear program, not certain we are finished with Iranian launch and attack capabilities, not certain that peace will break out here today, Aryeh.

Aryeh Golan: So was it right to enter a ceasefire? The Prime Minister announced to the political-security cabinet that he agreed with Trump that Israel agrees to a ceasefire. Was it too early?

Ran Kochav: It will be interesting after the war what the decision-making processes were for going to war, if the government approved it, the cabinet approved it, and also what the decision-making processes were for ending the war. Is it the authority of a single individual, even if he is the prime minister? Is it the authority of the cabinet, or is it the authority of the government? That is an interesting point. On the other side of the ocean, Trump decided to launch an attack on Iran using strategic bombers, without a decision from Congress. I assume we will deal with these things in the day after.

To understand Tehran – one must understand Karbala

Mohammad Frej
Walla
June 23, 2025

The struggle with Iran is not only about missiles and sanctions, but about identity and consciousness built on a 1,400-year-old historical trauma. The West will be able to deal with Tehran’s challenges only if it internalizes the depth of the cultural and mythological roots that drive its policy.

When President Trump renewed the “maximum pressure” policy on Iran on February 4, the response from Tehran was predictable: denial, threats, and escalation of nuclear activity. The West saw this as political stubbornness, but the truth is it missed the point once again. The struggle with Iran is not just a matter of missiles and sanctions—it is a clash of consciousnesses rooted deeply in a 1,400-year-old collective memory.

To understand the Iranian leadership, one must return to the plains of Karbala in 680 CE, where Imam Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, was killed in a hopeless struggle against the Umayyad Caliph Yazid. Hussein went to war knowing he would lose—not to seize power, but to uphold a moral principle: refusal to recognise illegitimate rule.
For Shiites, Karbala is not a historical event but a founding myth that repeats in every generation. The regime in Iran sees itself as the continuation of Hussein’s path—the righteous minority standing against an “evil empire.” When the Iranian foreign minister calls America “the Great Satan,” he is not engaging in empty rhetoric but activating a deep cultural code that defines Iran as the “province of resistance” against evil.

This consciousness translates into concrete policy. While Western foreign policy is driven by geopolitical interests and electoral timetables, Iran thinks in decades. Tehran’s investment in its nuclear program began already in the 1980s, long before the West grasped the scope of the problem. At the same time, Iran patiently built a “resistance axis” from Lebanon to Yemen—a network of allies enabling it to fight Israel and America without directly endangering the regime.
The clearest example of this is Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah. Iran invested billions of dollars in the organization over three decades to create a “new Hussein”—a force willing to die for the idea.

The West’s central error is the assumption that Iran acts according to a rational cost-benefit logic. When President Trump imposed “the harshest sanctions in history” on Iran in 2018, he expected economic pressure to subdue the regime. Instead, Iran responded by accelerating uranium enrichment and deepening cooperation with Russia and China. From the Iranian perspective, the sanctions were not a pressure tool but a confirmation of their worldview—the West as “the new Yazid” trying to bend the truth.

The 2015 nuclear agreement also partially failed due to cultural misunderstanding. The negotiations were conducted as if this were a business contract, but for Iran it was a test of honor. When Trump unilaterally withdrew from the agreement, Iran saw it not only as a breach of contract but as a personal insult demanding revenge.

Recognizing the cultural roots of Iranian policy does not mean yielding to its demands, but rather formulating a wiser strategy. A policy of strategic patience over 10–15 years is required:

• Phase One – Controlled containment: Abandon the illusion of a decisive military solution and invest in a consistent deterrence system alongside smart sanctions that target the elites, not the general population.

• Phase Two – Systematic attrition: Develop a system of incentives that will allow Iran to “exit with honour” from extreme positions, while recognising Iran’s legitimate regional role without compromising the demand to end nuclear activity.

• Phase Three – Internal transformation: Strengthen ties with moderate forces in the Shiite world and within Iran itself, support alternative voices that can challenge the regime’s ideological monopoly.

In conclusion, the struggle with Iran will not be decided in a nuclear lab or a situation room, but in the arena of consciousness. Iran operates from a logic of sanctified struggle, where death for the principle is preferable to life in shameful surrender. Instead of speaking only the language of power, the West must learn to speak the language of honour, symbolism, and history. Only in this way can a strategy be built that will ultimately bring a sustainable solution to the Iranian crisis.