In the Media

ABC Religion & Ethics – 24 June 2025

In the early morning hours of 13 June, Israel launched Operation Rising Lion. Since then, Israeli jets, drones and Mossad agents have targeted nuclear facilities, anti-aircraft batteries, missile launchers and military bases, and have killed a growing list of senior Iranian commanders and nuclear scientists. Iran retaliated by launching a barrage of drones and ballistic missiles at Israel, most of which were intercepted by Israel’s sophisticated multi-layered air defence systems.

Then, on 22 June, US B-2 stealth bombers reportedly dropped around fourteen GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs) — otherwise known as “bunker buster” bombs — and around sixty other “precision-guided weapons” on the fortified underground Iranian nuclear sites in Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan.

This dramatic turn of events marks the crescendo of a series of seismic shifts in the Middle East that began on 7 October 2023 with Hamas’ terror attack on southern Israel — the worst such violence in Israel’s history. Over the subsequent two years, Israel has set about dismantling the network of Iranian proxies surrounding its borders and re-established deterrence. Neutralising Iran’s atomic and long-range missile capabilities opens the door to a new regional balance of power, and offers hope for a more stable and prosperous future for millions in the region.

The debate over the war’s legality

No sooner had the conflict with Iran commenced than debates erupted over the legality of Israel’s actions. Some scholars argue that self-defence under international law only justifies pre-emptive strikes when the threat is imminent. Since Iran did not yet possess nuclear weapons and was allegedly not poised to attack Israel, they argue that Israel’s “aggression” was illegal.

The opposing view contends that Israel and Iran were already in a state of war, citing Iran’s massive missile and drone attacks on Israel in April and October 2024. Therefore, they argue, Israel’s current offensive is a lawful continuation of that conflict.

There was also substantial evidence supporting the imminence of an Iranian threat. Recently released intelligence suggested that Tehran was accelerating its weaponisation of highly enriched uranium and restocking thousands of new ballistic missiles. Additionally, Iran is governed by religious zealots who openly threaten to destroy Israel — words backed by their actions over the last two years. Combined with Iran’s destabilising activities across the region and assassination attempts against dissidents and world leaders — including Donald Trump — the threat appears to have been immediate and grave.

Perhaps understandably, many Israelis view international law and the UN with a degree of scepticism. The “automatic majority” of states in the UN General Assembly hostile to Israel has led to numerous anti-Israel and antisemitic resolutions — such as the repealed 1975 resolution equating Zionism with racism. In 1955, Israel’s founding father, David Ben-Gurion, famously mocked the UN as “UM-Shmum” (a dismissive play on the Hebrew acronym for the UN).

The sheer number of highly critical resolutions directed at Israel following 7 October 2023 by the UN and international law institutions like the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court has reinforced the Israeli belief that international law is often being used as a political tool against the Jewish state’s right to self-determination. Many Israelis argue that the application of international law at the UN and other bodies embodies clear a double standard grounded in this politicisation: obsessively scrutinising Israeli actions while ignoring the crimes of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran — a regime notorious for repressing any opposition, women, LGBTQ+ people and minorities.

Israel is often accused of human rights violations, particularly in Gaza. Yet it remains a democracy with robust judicial oversight — which were threatened by the Netanyahu government’s proposed judicial overhaul, but remains healthy. Such safeguards are entirely absent in the Islamic Republic, where the judiciary is simply a tool of the clerical leadership.

The operational window opens

The legal debate over Israel’s actions, while important, has been largely irrelevant to the pace of events on the ground. It was not a decisive factor in Israel’s decision-making regarding Iran.

Unlike superpowers, Israel cannot rely on prolonged operational flexibility. The rules-based order that prevailed after the Second World War deliberately complicates the ability to launch rapid pre-emptive actions — especially for a country like Israel, whose right to self-defence is often denied by many nations and some UN officials. Since surprise is essential to pre-emptive success, Israel had to act decisively. This is the essence of the “Begin Doctrine”, which underpinned Israeli strikes on nuclear reactors in Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007) and applies to Iran today.

The operational window matured earlier this year, leading to the decision to move before it closed again. Politically, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he decided to move forward against Iran as soon as Donald Trump was re-elected in November 2024. Over the intervening period, there seems to have been clear coordination between Israel and the United States.

Then, a damning report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program in late May led the agency’s Board of Governors to declare on 12 June that Iran is in “non-compliance” with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) — a major diplomatic milestone. Once the sixty-day ultimatum for Iran to conclude negotiations announced by President Trump expired, Israel launched its assault — an act that was widely seen as punishment for Iran’s intransigence in its negotiations with the Trump administration.

Military readiness and a dramatic reduction of Iran’s deterrence vis-à-vis Israel also played an important role. By late 2024, Israel had reduced Hamas to a guerilla force and gained control over much of the Gaza Strip. A surprise campaign against Hezbollah in September — which began with exploding pagers and a ground invasion of southern Lebanon — led to a ceasefire that left Iran’s most powerful proxy severely weakened and politically isolated. This left Hezbollah with no legitimacy to drag Lebanon, which is still recovering from the war, into another round of clashes with Israel, and a government in Beirut working to disarm it.

Ensuring airspace superiority en route to the Iranian sites was another factor. Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December, Israel destroyed Syrian anti-aircraft installations. The new ruler in Damascus, Ahmed al-Sharaa, expelled Iranian forces and was later embraced by President Trump. Syria, now fragmented and ruled by a weak central authority, no longer poses a threat to Israel.

In Iraq, under pressure from the United States, Iranian-backed Shi’ite militias are losing influence as Baghdad moves to disarm them. In October 2024, Israeli jets reportedly used Iraqi airspace to strike deep into Iran, demonstrating their long-range operational reach. More importantly, they struck Iran’s most advanced air-defence systems, leaving it “essentially naked” against an airborne attack.

The “day after” and political considerations

For now, the United States and other key international players support Israel. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz reportedly said Israel is “doing the dirty work for all of us”, and Middle Eastern states — including the influential Saudi Arabia — quietly support Israel’s efforts to eliminate a shared threat.

However, questions are emerging within Israel. With no resolution in Gaza after twenty months of fighting, many now ask whether Netanyahu is again entering a war without a clear exit strategy. Some hope the Iran campaign may finally bring closure — securing a deal with Hamas, releasing hostages and ending the suffering of both Israelis and Palestinians.

Iranians are a proud nation, and the Islamic Republic is still standing. Following a massive and humiliating assault, if the regime survives, the ayatollahs will most likely be more determined than ever to acquire nuclear weapons as a guarantee of survival.

To secure a real victory, Israel will need US leadership in brokering a ceasefire that includes robust and penetrating monitoring of Iran. As for regime change in Tehran, while revolutions are inherently unpredictable, such ambitions probably remain unrealistic at this stage. Without a strong domestic opposition, foreign bombing campaigns alone most likely cannot topple the regime.

Politically, Netanyahu has begun to see a steady rise in the polls following the apparent success of the Iran operation. Yet his critics argue that, as with Gaza, his push to attack Iran was influenced by political motivations — maintaining his coalition with hardline right-wing parties, which are now claiming credit for the campaign, the same way they “boasted” after blocking attempts to reach a ceasefire with Hamas.

Above all, Netanyahu is seeking to reshape the narrative about his legacy. Until recently, his story was about Israel’s longest-serving prime minister who divided Israeli society over controversial judicial reforms, enabled Hamas to increase its power in Gaza leading to the terrible shock of 7 October, and was working to enable the bill which would legitimise military exemptions for ultra-Orthodox youth during wartime. More than anything, it seems, Netanyahu wants to remove the stain of his direct responsibility — which he refuses to admit — for the 7 October attack. Perhaps he now hopes to be remembered instead as the leader who brought Iran to its knees, ending an existential threat to Israel and changing the regional power balance in her favour.

These are historic times. In the coming weeks, we will see whether the bold Israeli and American intervention has sown the seeds of peace — or of the next war.

Ran Porat teaches Israel and Middle Eastern Affairs at Monash University and is a research associate at the Australian Centre for Jewish Civilisation. He is also a research associate at the Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC) and a research fellow at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism at Reichman University in Herzliya.