In the Media

The Australian – 30 October 2025

Three weeks into Gaza’s ceasefire, the calm feels fragile. Hamas is reasserting control in areas from which Israel has withdrawn and has declared it won’t disarm. It is also testing Israeli and international resolve by violating the ceasefire, in terms of handing back bodies of murdered hostages and attacking Israeli forces. Meanwhile, the international force promised by President Trump – and officially accepted by Hamas – remains theoretical, with potential parties shying away from having to confront Hamas.

This moment represents a key challenge for US leadership: how to turn a military victory into a durable peace. For that, Washington can look to the past.

In 1945, Germany lay in ruins – its cities flattened, seven million dead in a war it started, its land occupied by foreign forces. The Nazis had placed ideology above the welfare of their own people, and the result was catastrophe. Yet within decades, Germany became a democratic, peaceful, and prosperous country. That transformation was no historical accident but the product of clear-sighted American policy and a steely determination to see it through.

The parallels between Nazi Germany and Hamas-controlled Gaza are clear and instructive. Both pursued a murderous ideology that glorified violence, elevated destruction over life, and built politics around the hatred of Jews. Both indoctrinated their people into hatred and led them into devastation. And in both cases, the aftermath presented an opportunity – not just to rebuild cities, but to reconstruct societies.

If it is serious about ending the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the world must treat Hamas’ defeat as the defeat of an existential ideology – just like it did with the Nazis – rather than merely a border dispute to be negotiated away.

In Germany, the US and allies imposed and enforced a comprehensive denazification program. Nazi officials were stripped from public life, war criminals were tried – not merely for reasons of justice, but to send a message – and educational institutions were overhauled. The propaganda that had poisoned the minds of German children since 1933 was replaced with historical truth about what the Nazis did and represented. A new constitution embedded democracy and outlawed racial incitement. Allied support under the Marshall Plan – worth roughly $160 billion in today’s dollars – was conditional on reforms being implemented. This was nothing short of a societal overhaul. And US troops stayed to ensure that the overhaul endured. Eight decades after the war, there are still US forces in Germany.

The model worked because Washington understood that military victory alone was insufficient. Winning the peace required social, political, and moral reconstruction. The same is true in Gaza.

For the US, the stakes are not just humanitarian but strategic. A Gaza that again descends into extremism will threaten Israel, embolden those in the region who seek to undermine Western preponderance, and erode the credibility of American leadership. Preventing that outcome is a matter of national interest, not charity.

America must insist on the same clarity of purpose it had in the 1940s. Billions of dollars will soon flow into reconstruction. Without accompanying reform, that money risks rebuilding the launch pads for the next conflict. Gaza needs transformation, not just recovery.

That means four things.

First, any international force in Gaza must be both willing and able to use force to prevent terrorist re-organisation. The experience in Lebanon – where United Nations peacekeepers, for decades, turned a blind eye as Hezbollah armed itself – shows what happens when good intentions meet a lack of resolve. The US should not allow that failure to repeat itself.

Second, governance must be rebuilt from the ground up. Gaza will need leadership untainted by Hamas, the Palestinian Authority’s corruption or terrorist factions. Constitutional reform – backed by credible international oversight – should guarantee civil rights and the separation of powers while outlawing incitement and terror. The world has demanded this of the Palestinian Authority for three decades. It must finally mean it.

Third, education must be transformed. Gaza’s children deserve textbooks and teachers who teach coexistence, tolerance, and truth, not martyrdom and hate. For years, UN-run schools have employed teachers who glorify terrorism online. A US-led reconstruction should make funding conditional on full educational reform – and not just in Gaza.

Fourth, economic aid and diplomatic largesse must be results-based, not time-bound. The Marshall Plan was not a blank cheque; it was tied to political and economic reform. Aid to Gaza should likewise depend on progress toward demilitarisation, educational change, and democratic institution-building. Washington’s announcement that no reconstruction funds would enter areas under Hamas control is a good start.

Gazans deserve better than to be cast as perpetual victims when they can be partners in reform. By tying aid to results, Washington would not just promote reform but protect its own investment. A peaceful, functional Gaza serves US and allied security interests far better than another generation of radicalisation and war.

None of this will be easy. Well-meaning critics will accuse the US of “neo-colonialism” or of denying Palestinian sovereignty. But similar arguments were made in 1945. The Allies did not shy away from imposing what was necessary because they knew what the alternative looked like.

The US won both the war and the peace in Germany. Israel has won the war in Gaza, but it is unable to win the peace. The US can, but it depends on whether Washington applies the lessons of 1945.

Hamas has been emulating Nazi Germany for decades. It is time for Gazans – with American help – to emulate post-war Germany, to build a society that values life over death, coexistence over destruction and stability over perpetual conflict. It can be done, but it will take strategic clarity and a whole lot of grit.

Dr Bren Carlill is the director of special projects at the Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council. His PhD examined the history of the Israeli–Palestinian dispute and the reasons for its intractability.