Australia/Israel Review

The Middle East rollercoaster is hurtling forward at full speed.

When Ahmed al-Shara’a toppled the Assad dynasty in early December 2024 after its more than 54 years in power, it would have been hard to imagine that, just over five months later, the former rebel leader and al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadi would find himself shaking hands with US President Donald Trump. And that was just a week after visiting French President Emmanuel Macron in the Élysée Palace. 

Further, the notion that Shara’a’s Syria and Israel might engage in indirect negotiations and discuss the possibility of normalisation – even exploring Syria’s potential inclusion in the Abraham Accords – would have seemed far-fetched in the extreme.

In the immediate aftermath of Shara’a’s attaining the Syrian presidency, Israel launched Operation “Arrow of Bashan” [the biblical name for the area conquered by the Israelites from King Og], targeting Syrian military installations and infrastructure. These operations included extensive aerial and naval strikes, resulting in the destruction of significant portions of Syria’s military capabilities, including its air force, armoured corps, navy and chemical weapons stockpiles. 

Israeli forces also crossed into southern Syria, seizing a buffer zone of approximately 460 km² to prevent jihadi forces from targeting the border region. Since then, Israel has conducted several strikes, including one just 500 metres from the presidential palace on May 2, responding to attacks on the Druze community in southern Syria, which Israel has vowed to protect.

Israeli officials also launched a diplomatic offensive against Syria’s new leader, with Foreign Minister Gideon Saar labelling Shara’a and his Government as “jihadists in suits” after an apparent massacre of Alawites in Syria’s coastal region by government-affiliated militias. He urged Europe to “stop granting legitimacy to a regime whose first actions… are these atrocities.”

However, in early May, it emerged that Israel and Syria had been holding talks through back channels in the United Arab Emirates and Azerbaijan. According to a Reuters report, the back channel was opened after Shara’a visited the UAE on April 13 for a meeting with President Sheikh Muhammad bin Zayed al-Nahyan, more than two weeks before the strike near the presidential palace. Syrian security forces confirmed that discussions had taken place on “technical matters” related to security issues and counterterrorism, without addressing Israeli military activities in Syria.

Israeli media reported that these back-channel talks occurred at a private residence in Abu Dhabi belonging to a senior security official, involving two Israeli academics with backgrounds in security and three close aides to Shara’a. According to the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth, the parties aim to continue the dialogue and expand it to include economic matters – such as possible Israeli medical aid, academic exchange programs for Syrian students and other areas of mutual concern.

On May 7, Shara’a flew to Paris for talks with French President Emmanuel Macron. There, the Syrian President confirmed that “There are indirect negotiations taking place through intermediaries to ease the situation and attempt to absorb it, so that matters do not reach a point of losing control by both sides.”

A week later, Shara’a travelled from Damascus to Riyadh to meet President Trump during Trump’s whirlwind Middle East tour, which included Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE, but not Israel. Trump announced his intention to lift sanctions on Syria despite Israeli efforts to prevent him from doing so before certain conditions were fulfilled. The US President urged the former jihadi, who once fought the US in Iraq and had a US$10 million bounty on his head, to join the Abraham Accords and normalise ties with Israel. Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman also attended the meeting, while Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan joined by phone.

Following the meeting, reports emerged of further higher-level back-channel talks between Israel and Syria in the Azeri capital, Baku. According to CNN, the head of the IDF’s Operations Directorate, Maj. Gen. Oded Basyuk, met with Syrian Government representatives in the presence of Turkish officials. Israeli media reported that members of Israel’s National Security Council also attended the meeting, which was part of broader discussions regarding a deconfliction mechanism with Turkey in Syria.

Syrian political researcher Dr Nader Khalil told the independent Syrian Enab Baladi website that direct normalisation between the new Syrian leadership under Ahmad al-Shara’a and Israel is unlikely in the short term but could become a reality in the medium to long term. According to Khalil, the current regional context, with multiple mediation channels at play, provides a framework for indirect negotiations. While these talks are unlikely to lead to full normalisation, they could result in limited, local security agreements in the near future.

Yet even as Israel and Syria inch toward tentative dialogue, the road to normalisation – or even limited coordination – is strewn with obstacles.

First of all, from Israel’s perspective, Shara’a is a former jihadi with roots in al-Qaeda. For many in Jerusalem, Shara’a’s newfound pragmatism appears less like a genuine change of heart and more like a tactical adjustment to buy time to solidify his regime.

In addition, even if Shara’a’s intentions are genuine, there is no guarantee that he has the ability to impose control over a country where various jihadi groups remain active and pose a threat to both the regime and Israel. Israel’s concern is the potential for a situation akin to Libya, where the West welcomed the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, but the country subsequently fractured into two competing spheres of influence, lacking a central state – a situation which continues today.

Despite the talks and Trump’s optimistic forecasts that Damascus could join the Abraham Accords, Israel is currently relying on force and acting as a regional power, no longer willing to remain on the sidelines.

Israel has numerous interests in Syria, including ensuring that Damascus no longer poses a threat and that Iran cannot use the country as a conduit for weapons transfers to Hezbollah. Additionally, Israel says it is committed to the Druze population concentrated in southern Syria and desires to see the Kurdish areas in the north maintain their autonomous status.

Israel also prefers that Saudi Arabia and the UAE – not Qatar, which supports Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood – contribute the hundreds of billions of dollars required for Syria’s reconstruction. This ties into the question of Qatar’s partner, Turkey, which has ambitions in Syria and close ties to the new regime there. Israel has already warned that Turkey establishing air bases in the Palmyra region would cross its red lines. Israeli airstrikes in early April destroyed three Syrian air bases that Ankara was believed to be considering using for deploying Turkish forces. The talks that occurred in Azerbaijan followed this incident, with the aim to de-escalate tensions to prevent a direct clash. Jerusalem reportedly warned the Turks that any expansion of their current military deployments in Syria would be viewed as a “dangerous infringement” on Israel’s security.

At a recent symposium on Syria held by the Jerusalem Institute of Strategy and Security, Col. (res.) Eran Lerman, a former Israeli Deputy National Security Advisor, noted that while Turkey has a long-term neo-Ottoman vision and seeks to control large swathes of Syria, it is not currently seeking a direct confrontation with Israel.

However, Dr Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, an expert on contemporary Turkish politics and foreign policy, argued that Erdogan will aspire to make Syria a satellite state. He expressed concern that Erdogan, who has been in power for over two decades and has eroded the checks and balances of the Turkish state whilst neutralising his rivals and the judiciary, seeks to establish his legacy as the leader who restored Turkey’s greatness. This means expanding Ankara’s influence in Africa, Iraq and the eastern Mediterranean, and there is little to stop Turkey from expanding in Syria.

“After October 7, we don’t have the luxury of ignoring any threat. We must keep our eyes open and distance the Turks from our northern border,” warns Yanarocak.