Australia/Israel Review

As the US-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Hamas came to an end on March 1, the Middle East region entered into a time of great uncertainty.

Yet that climate of uncertainty also contains elements of opportunity for positive changes in the region that previously appeared impossible.

For over two weeks after the ceasefire lapsed, even in the absence of further agreement, Israel kept negotiating. It essentially gave Hamas a goodwill grace period without receiving anything in return, even as the terror group was clearly using the time to rebuild, rearm and prepare for future attacks. That restraint ended starting on March 18, when Israel resumed targeted airstrikes on Hamas commanders and officials.

Accusations that floated in the media that Israel somehow “violated the ceasefire” are nonsense. The ceasefire had lapsed. Hamas could have extended the first phase and continued to receive benefits from releasing hostages, but refused to do so. 

Criticism of Israel that it failed to enter “phase two” of the January ceasefire ignores the fact that the details of that phase were always to be negotiated, and the ceasefire agreement made it clear that the war could be resumed if negotiations broke down – as they clearly had in this case. 

Israel had accepted a US proposal for a two-month ceasefire in exchange for ten living hostages. Hamas rejected it, insultingly offered just one living hostage and four bodies for the same period, and then appeared to simply stall for time. 

Moreover, the first phase of the agreement saw Hamas delaying some hostage releases while also grotesquely subjecting emaciated, desperate hostages to humiliating pre-handover “ceremonies” where they were forced to wade through hostile crowds and ingratiate themselves with their captors on stage while surrounded by armed terrorists. Even the bodies of the murdered Bibas children were not spared such “celebrations”. 

Israel is thus wholly justified in resuming the war, though there naturally exists a great deal of disagreement within Israel over how renewed fighting will affect the 24 hostages believed to be alive, and in a desperate plight if the horrifying experiences of the hostages that have been released is any guide. 

Cynics pointed out that resuming the war benefitted Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu politically by keeping far-right ministers in his coalition. Yet all of Israel’s top security officials, even including Ronen Bar – the head of Israel’s internal security agency Shin Bet whom the Prime Minister is trying to fire – agreed that, given Hamas’ complete intransigence on another hostage deal, renewed military pressure had to be applied. So the military/security case for Israel’s actions seems clear, whatever their political effects.

Meanwhile, there is good reason to believe the current round of fighting can lead to a more decisive outcome than the fighting over the previous 16 months did –  if Hamas does not relent and agree to a more reasonable hostage deal in the face of that military pressure.

The IDF’s highly regarded new Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir has introduced new tactical and strategic methods to further weaken Hamas – including targeting those organising its governance and finance as well as the military wing, while expressing a new willingness to take and hold Gaza neighbourhoods for extended periods, directly distribute aid and launch operations on multiple fronts at once. The evidence so far suggests these methods appear highly effective, with Hamas looking stunned and disorganised, and facing opposition demonstrations from Gazans.

Also shaking up the situation in the region have been the Trump Administration’s new policies, not only regarding Israel and the Palestinians, but Iran as well.

Setting aside President Trump’s very controversial domestic and foreign policies unrelated to these spheres, the steps he has taken so far regarding Israel and Iran have created important opportunities that did not exist under the Biden Administration.

Trump has rightly removed all obstacles to Israel’s weapons resupply from US stocks, including, for example, quadrupling Israel’s fleet of lifesaving D9 bulldozers – essential for safely detonating massive IEDs and booby-trapped houses ahead of advancing troops. And the Administration has backed tough Israeli action against Hamas following the negotiations impasse in a way it is hard to imagine the Biden Administration doing, including both the military attacks and Israel’s temporary aid cut off to Gaza. The latter appears critical, as the evidence is overwhelming that Hamas has been using aid flows as a vital lifeline to rebuild its military capabilities and authority over Gazans, even as there is ample food stockpiled inside Gaza. 

Meanwhile, the US began launching sustained and serious attacks against the Houthis of Yemen in order to end their blockade of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which has cost the world billions of dollars in shipping expenses.

Importantly, Trump has rightly called out Iran’s responsibility for the Houthis’ piratical behaviour in very strong language. This is part of a suite of measures on Iran that offers new hope that the promises from successive US Administrations that Iran will never be allowed to build nuclear weapons may under Trump actually lead to serious action, rather than just kicking the can down the road – which we have often seen in the past. 

By setting a two-month deadline for Iran to agree to a longer and stronger nuclear deal, Trump has signalled both the urgency the US has placed on stopping Iran’s nuclear weapons program and that Washington is determined not to allow Teheran to string out negotiations as a way to stall for time as it has done so often in the past.

At the same time, the US has given Israel all the bunker-busting bombs it needs to carry out a strike on Iran’s nuclear sites, and is signalling its own openness to possible US military action in the near future if Teheran refuses to make a nuclear deal, or attempts a breakout. 

So while the Trump Administration is disruptive and unpredictable, with possible negative global effects in some areas, in the Middle East that disruption of past tradition and thinking may be creating new opportunities, as well as risks. The next few months will be crucial in determining whether these opportunities – in Gaza, in Lebanon, in Yemen and elsewhere, and especially in terms of Iran’s accelerating rush to the bomb – can be successfully exploited. If so, the results could be genuinely transformative.