Australia/Israel Review


Trump 2.0

Nov 20, 2024 | Ilan Evyatar

Donald Trump with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu at his Mar-a-Lago estate, Florida, July 26, 2024 (Image: PMO/ Flickr)
Donald Trump with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu at his Mar-a-Lago estate, Florida, July 26, 2024 (Image: PMO/ Flickr)

How his election win looks from Israel

 

Donald Trump’s imminent return to the White House, following his sweeping United States election triumph over Kamala Harris on November 5, was greeted with satisfaction in Jerusalem after four years of sometimes strained relations with the Biden Administration. According to polls, some 70% of Israelis from across the political spectrum had wanted to see a Trump victory, believing he would be more supportive of Israel than Harris. Now that he is headed back to Pennsylvania Avenue, Netanyahu will hope for a much freer hand in Israel’s wars with Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as in its ongoing conflict with Iran.

Netanyahu believes that a second Trump Administration will offer staunch support for Israel. During Trump’s first term, his policies toward Israel were marked by significant pro-Israel actions: he moved the US embassy to Jerusalem, recognised Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights and facilitated the Abraham Accords, which normalised relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan. In line with Israel’s policies, Trump also withdrew the US from the 2015 Iran nuclear accord brokered by the Obama Administration, cut ties with UNRWA and closed the Palestinian representative office in Washington. 

One American media outlet proclaimed facetiously that it was Netanyahu who had won the US election.

Within days of Trump’s election, Netanyahu had spoken three times with the President-elect. “These were very good and important conversations,” Netanyahu said. “We see eye to eye on the Iranian threat in all its components, and the danger it poses. We also see the great opportunities that Israel faces, in the field of peace and its expansion, and in other areas.”

Trump’s stated positions on Israel’s conflicts with Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon suggest he will give Israel a freer hand than it has had under the Biden Administration – but may also be impatient to see these conflicts ended quickly. While the Biden Administration provided strong military support and financial aid to Israel, it also applied pressure on the Netanyahu Government to refrain from certain military actions and occasionally suggested that arms supplies might be restricted if Israel did not meet specific humanitarian goals in Gaza. Reports suggest there have been a number of overt or covert efforts to withhold or delay certain arms shipments to Israel by elements of the Biden Administration as a means of exerting pressure on Jerusalem. 

Trump has emphasised that Netanyahu should aim to “finish the job” swiftly, suggesting that Israel may enjoy more flexibility in pursuing its military goals.

Trump’s hawkish and pro-Israel cabinet, executive, and political appointments suggest the President-elect will likely continue a similar approach in the Middle East to that of his first term. 

His nominee for Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, has publicly opposed a ceasefire in Gaza, stating that Israel should “destroy every element of Hamas they can get their hands on.” Pete Hegseth, the nominee for Secretary of Defense and a National Guard veteran and Fox News host, has rejected a two-state solution. John Ratcliffe, nominated as CIA Director, has been a critic of Biden’s policies toward Israel. Trump’s choice for UN Ambassador, Elise Stefanik, is also known for her pro-Israel stances. Mike Huckabee, former governor of Arkansas and Trump’s nominee for US Ambassador to Israel, further underscores what Israel hopes Trump’s second term will look like. Huckabee, an Evangelical minister before his political career, has said, “There is no such thing as a West Bank – it’s Judea and Samaria. There’s no such thing as a settlement. They’re communities. They’re neighbourhoods. They’re cities. There’s no such thing as an occupation.”

Perhaps the most critical issue for Netanyahu currently is Iran. Following Israel’s late October precision strikes on Iranian missile production facilities, a nuclear site and air defences – responding to Iran’s large-scale ballistic missile attacks of Oct. 1 – Iran has again vowed to retaliate. This year’s series of direct exchanges of blows between the two countries has been a very significant escalation of the previously indirect war between Teheran and Jerusalem. 

Trump’s 2018 decision to exit the Iran nuclear deal and impose strict sanctions on Teheran was welcomed – and perhaps encouraged behind the scenes – by Netanyahu, who now hopes the second Trump Administration will take an even tougher stance on Iran. With Iran reportedly very close to nuclear breakout capability, and some Iranian officials speaking of potential changes in the Islamic Republic’s nuclear policy – meaning openly progressing towards an atomic bomb – Netanyahu will be hoping that the US will take a tougher stance against Iran, potentially reintroducing crippling economic sanctions. Trump suggested on the campaign trail that Israel should strike Iran’s nuclear program,  something that has long been canvassed as a last resort in Jerusalem, but always opposed by Washington.

 

In anticipation of Trump’s return, Netanyahu’s Strategic Affairs Minister, Ron Dermer, has engaged in meetings with Trump’s transition team and met with the President-elect at his Mar-a-Lago retreat. Topics reportedly included the nuclear issue, Israel’s strategies for managing conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon, and the normalisation process with Saudi Arabia – a step that could shift regional dynamics significantly. Saudi-Israeli normalisation would not only represent a major shift in Arab-Israeli relations, but would also significantly strengthen the coalition of moderate Arab states that, along with Israel, oppose Iranian hegemonistic intentions for the region.

Saudi Arabia, while not part of the Abraham Accords, has responded positively to Trump’s victory. Saudi officials have indicated that Trump’s approach could facilitate a Saudi-Israeli agreement that appeared close to being finalised under Biden before it was derailed by the October 7 attack. Saudi media outlets have suggested that, following what they viewed as the Biden Administration’s failure to achieve major breakthroughs, Trump’s return could bring renewed stability to the region and possibly turn “peace into a reality.” Nonetheless, Saudi leaders continue to state that they would want assurances that any agreement with Israel includes a clear path to Palestinian statehood.

Emirati commentators, too, have expressed confidence that Trump will renew US support for the Abraham Accords and seek to bring Saudi Arabia into the fold. 

While the second Trump Administration is expected to offer Israel more freedom in the military sphere, Trump has reportedly conveyed that he expects Jerusalem to act swiftly in Gaza and Lebanon. He could also introduce a modified plan to broker an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal after his “Deal of the Century” peace proposal unveiled in his first term was vehemently rejected by the Palestinians and the Arab side. 

Inside Israel, Trump’s return has prompted some officials to emphasise the importance of maintaining bipartisan support for Israel in the United States. Trump and his populist base have polarised American society, leading to concerns that traditional bipartisan support in Washington for Israel, already under threat from anti-Israel elements of the Democratic party, might erode further if Israel is seen as aligning too closely with Trump or the Republican party, or as a purely conservative priority. To maintain sustained American support, particularly within the American Jewish community, most Israeli leaders, including Netanyahu, see value in fostering cross-party relationships in the United States. Despite this, Netanyahu has, at times, struggled to conceal his personal preference for Republicans.

Israel may face another challenge with respect to Trump’s sceptical approach to foreign aid. Although Trump is expected to continue supporting Israel, he has long been vocal about reducing foreign aid expenditures, while suggesting a shift from grants to repayable loans. If this approach were to include Israel, it could have substantial implications for Israel’s defence budget, especially amid the greatly increased military demands on Israel in the wake of October 7 and the other attacks by Iran and its proxies since then. As Israel prepares to negotiate a new memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Washington on defence aid, the change of government in Washington is likely to complicate these negotiations.

In summary, Trump’s return to the presidency is being closely watched in Israel and across the Middle East. Israeli officials are hopeful that his second term will strengthen Israel’s strategic position and also lead to significant improvements in Jerusalem’s diplomatic position. Meanwhile, moderate Arab states also tend to view Trump’s election as a possible opportunity to solidify alliances, including with Israel, that could stabilise the region and counter Iranian aggression – but any such process is neither simple nor straightforward. The Palestinian question, however, remains a central and unresolved issue that could complicate progress toward peace.

In the lead up to Jan. 20, when Trump again takes office, regional leaders are watching developments closely, aiming to secure their own interests in a changing Middle Eastern landscape. Netanyahu certainly sees Trump’s return as an opportunity to advance Israel’s strategic priorities in Gaza, Lebanon and beyond, to deepen alliances with Arab states, and above all, build the preconditions to finally deal effectively with the escalating Iranian threat. 

Of course, the future remains uncertain, and Trump’s notorious unpredictability makes any forecasts dubious. But it seems likely that Trump’s return will mark a pivotal moment for the region, with long-term and significant implications for Israel’s security situation and role in it.

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