Australia / Israel Review

Among the many challenges facing the incoming Trump Administration is an Iran on the edge of nuclear arms. The mullahs have used the Biden years well, filling their coffers and advancing their atomic project. Much has changed in the Middle East since October 7, 2023, and Israel has been more daring in taking on its enemies. But a middle power can do only so much, particularly when constantly badgered by a procession of US Democratic party luminaries.

Among the regional changes is how the mullahs conceive of their war against Israel. The Iranian theocracy now knows that its proxy strategy is flawed, that its conventional ballistic missiles lack accuracy and punch, and that the Jewish state can bomb anything inside Iran, with the possible exception of the clerical regime’s deeply buried uranium-enrichment plants.

At least one aspect, however, has remained constant. In its raid on Iran on Oct. 26, Israel didn’t attack the greatest threat: Iran’s nuclear weapons sites. Nor did it strike what would cause the most immediate, regime-shaking pain, the Kharg Island oil facility, through which about 90% of the Islamic Republic’s oil exports are shipped. Israel again showed its discomfort with escalating against Iran. That is likely owing in part to the Biden Administration’s prodding for restraint, but also to an/the Israeli fear that its fighter-bombers could fail against the Fordow uranium-enrichment site, which is buried beneath a mountain.

The Israeli Government hopes the air force’s strikes inside Iran will induce more nuclear hesitation – that the regime won’t enrich uranium to weapons grade and assemble an atomic trigger. Israelis may be praying that Trump will relieve Jerusalem of the task of bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities, or at least support Israel if it tries to do so. Given the nature of the threat, and how close the regime is to the bomb, time may no longer be on Israel’s side.

For the first time, important Iranian constituencies are publicly calling for the state to build nuclear weapons. On Oct. 2, Javan, a newspaper that is a mouthpiece of the Revolutionary Guards, stressed that, given the Israeli use of “devastating military technology to establish a new order… one immediate option is a shift in Iran’s nuclear doctrine.” It added that “while Iran’s nuclear doctrine over the past 50 years (including the Pahlavi era) has been focused on the peaceful use of nuclear technology, today, Teheran has the capacity, context and opportunity for an immediate transformation of this program.” A week later, 39 parliamentarians appealed to the Supreme National Security Council to change Iran’s defence doctrine. A chorus of Iranian VIPs have since come out in favour of developing the A-bomb to check Israel and the US.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei not so subtly nodded to his protégés. As his webpage describes, he remarked that “certain individuals, through a misguided analysis and perception, imagine that refraining from producing tools that could provoke the arrogant powers, such as missiles, can bring security for Iran.” The cleric wasn’t speaking only about missiles. No Western power – including the US, in the 2015 nuclear deal – has ever tried to oblige the Islamic Republic to forgo its missilery.

Jerusalem’s assessment of Iran’s nuclear threat, and of whatever military actions need to be taken against it, is increasingly intelligence-based. Israeli leaders posit that the air force doesn’t need to act until the Iranians are enriching uranium to 90% and are assembling a nuclear initiator. This is similar to what the Obama Administration argued when it advanced its nuclear deal: The US didn’t need to worry about secret sites, undeclared weaponisation research, centrifuge parts and dual-use stockpiles because the Central Intelligence Agency and United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors would catch the Iranians cheating. Senior Biden Administration officials suggest the same today.

In practice, however, Washington has never known when its enemies were dashing to the bomb, let alone initiated a military plan to stop them. Perhaps the Israelis will do better. Perhaps they have multiple intelligence sources inside the nuclear program who can alert them. In private, senior Israeli and American officials haven’t given the impression that Israel’s intelligence network inside Iran is that good.

So far, Israeli intelligence has been good enough to wound and embarrass the Iranian theocracy. But how many times could Jerusalem strike non-nuclear targets in Iran before the clerical regime “dashed” to the bomb in order to stop the Zionists from attacking?

A purge of the Islamic Republic’s security services may be in the works. That, along with intensified surveillance of those who have access to the nuclear program, would allow the clerical regime to feel more secure if it decides that building a bomb is an urgent priority. Fear of leaks has likely been one of the reasons Khamenei has been cautious about completing the project that he’s advanced for 30 years against enormous outside pressure.

As always, America remains the wild card in Khamenei’s calculations. The American political class doesn’t seem keen on patrolling or disciplining an unruly Mideast – but the US remains a superpower capable of damaging – if not derailing – the bomb project if it chooses to. Trump’s most consequential accomplishment was killing Iran’s dark lord, Gen. Qassem Soleimani, which spooked the regime. The new President’s unpredictability could slow down the regime’s nuclear aspirations. But the fear of the impending Trump Administration could cause the mullahs to dash to the bomb, hoping that American and Israeli intelligence will fail to detect their move.

Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former CIA Iran-targets officer, is a resident scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. © Wall Street Journal (wsj.com), reprinted by permission, all rights reserved.