Australia/Israel Review

Why Trump’s Gaza plan likely won’t work

On November 17, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2803, endorsing the US Trump Administration’s ambitious blueprint for Gaza’s post-war future. Its vision is sweeping: a sustained ceasefire; a technocratic Palestinian committee to administer Gaza’s civil affairs; an International Stabilisation Force (ISF); Palestinian Authority (PA) reform; and a political horizon for eventual Palestinian statehood.

While many things could go wrong with the plan, here is one that few talk about: It presumes Palestinians will accept demilitarisation and non-violence, international oversight, the PA returning to Gaza and a shift from armed confrontation to diplomacy. 

But years of public opinion surveys suggest that few of these will be acceptable to most Palestinians. Across 11 years of polling by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), reviewed by the Australia/Israel Review, Palestinians repeatedly express preferences that contradict the major pillars of the plan.

What is the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research?

The PCPSR has been conducting surveys of Palestinians since 1993. Substantially funded by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, its research is trusted by Israeli, Palestinian and American academics and policymakers. The PCPSR typically conducts surveys every three months (though the two-year Gaza war has disrupted this regularity). 

While many of the questions in each PCPSR survey are about the issues of the day, many others are repeated on a regular basis. Some are repeated in almost every survey. This enables researchers to capture trends in Palestinian public opinion over long periods of time. 

The AIR has tracked responses to PCPSR surveys since the beginning of 2014.

Ceasefire, violence and the effectiveness of armed action

UNSCR 2803 assumes that Hamas will sustain the ceasefire “in good faith and without delay.” Yet more than a decade of PCPSR polling shows that Palestinians don’t want Hamas to do this.

Support for attacking Israeli civilians has remained remarkably stable. Between the beginning of 2014 and September 2023, a long-term average of 50% of Palestinians supported attacks on Israeli civilians inside Israel, with 46% opposed.

Other related questions reveal similar results. Asked in almost every survey to choose between armed struggle, negotiations or “non-violent resistance” as the best or most effective way to achieve statehood, violence was almost always the most popular, with an average of 43%, compared with 28% who chose negotiations and 22% who chose non-violence. 

Asked in June 2020 to choose between withdrawing from the Oslo agreements, returning to armed struggle, resorting to peaceful resistance, adopting a one-state solution or returning to negotiations, a plurality chose armed struggle. 

Asked on various occasions about bombs on Israeli buses, and attempts to stab or run over Israelis, a majority always supported these attacks.

The notion that the post-Gaza war environment will produce a sudden, durable shift toward non-violence is not supported by any aspect of the polling record.

Indeed, across six PCPSR polls since October 7, majorities in the West Bank consistently said that Hamas’ decision to launch the attack was “correct”, and support for these attacks in Gaza – after gradually falling – rose again in October 2025.

Demilitarisation

A centrepiece of UNSCR 2803 is the demilitarisation of Gaza. The ISF is tasked with ensuring “the permanent decommissioning of weapons,” the destruction of offensive infrastructure and the prevention of any reconstruction of armed capability. The future of Gaza, as envisaged by the resolution, is explicitly non-militarised.

But Palestinian public opinion reflects the opposite preference.

PCPSR polling is unequivocal: Palestinians don’t want a demilitarised state. Asked in December 2014, December 2015 and December 2018 about the concept, they rejected it by an average of 70%.

Other polls show that majorities also oppose disarming Hamas and other armed groups, even when disarmament is tied to statehood. Most Palestinians also reject the idea that the PA should have a monopoly over armed force. For instance, in December 2022, 87% of Palestinians said that PA security forces did not have the right to disarm armed groups in order to prevent them from carrying out attacks against Israelis. 

In October 2025, Palestinians were asked, “Do you support the element in the Trump plan that demands the disarmament of Hamas in the Gaza Strip even if this is a condition for the war to not return?” Seventy-eight per cent of West Bank Palestinians and 55% of Gazans opposed this.

Governance, legitimacy, the PA and technocrats

UNSCR 2803 envisions Gaza being run by a technocratic, apolitical committee supervised by a ‘Board of Peace’, until a reformed PA can assume control.

Around 80% of Palestinians say the PA is corrupt. And majorities say the PA violates freedoms. Most Palestinians describe the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people. Overwhelming majorities say PA President Mahmoud Abbas should resign.

While Abbas, associated with endemic corruption, is deeply unpopular, clean technocrats fare no better. Salam Fayyad – widely respected internationally – is consistently unpopular. By contrast, convicted terrorist Marwan Barghouti remains the most popular figure, with former Hamas leader in Gaza Ismail Haniyeh – until his death – being the second most popular. 

The Palestinian public tends to reward violent credentials over administrative competence. 

In September 2024, Palestinians were asked about international plans for a “revitalised” PA with international and Arab support. Seventy-three per cent of Palestinians said they were against this plan. 

Moreover, a majority of Palestinians do not believe that the PA is currently reforming, despite its announcements about doing so. Further, a majority don’t believe that the PA will hold elections within 12 months of the ceasefire beginning, despite it promising to do so. 

Asked specifically about Trump’s plan, in October 2025, only 45% supported the plan’s call for a technocratic Palestinian committee, under international auspices, to run Gaza.

In the same survey, 52% of Palestinians (including 45% of Gazans) opposed a role for the PA in which it would coordinate the administration of the Gaza Strip with such a committee. 

In good news for the PA and international hopes, opposition to the return of the PA to Gaza has dropped from 70% in September last year to 41% in October this year. However, despite this bare-majority acceptance of the PA assuming control of Gaza, the fact that technocrats and the current PA leadership are so unpopular and that only half of Gazans support the idea of a technocratic committee (and very few Palestinians believe the PA will reform) undermines the international community’s assumptions about Gaza’s future governance.

Foreign forces, security arrangements and external control

UNSCR 2803 authorises a multinational ‘International Stabilisation Force’ to temporarily assume security control over Gaza. Notwithstanding the reported difficulties in recruiting countries to join what amounts to (on paper, at least) a peace-enforcing force, for the plan to work Palestinians must accept a foreign security presence enforcing demilitarisation, securing borders, training police and coordinating with Israel and Egypt.

Polling shows they do not.

In December 2023, 60% of Gazans (and 77% of West Bank Palestinians) said they opposed the idea of an Arab security contingent helping the PA maintain security after the war. Asked a similar but more specific question in June 2024, 77% of Gazans (and 73% of West Bank Palestinians) said no to “If the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are unified under the control of the Palestinian Authority, would you support the deployment of an Arab security contingent from countries like Egypt or Jordan to provide support for the PA and help maintain security?” Again, in May 2025, 65% of Palestinians rejected the idea of Jordan and Egypt providing forces to help maintain security of Gaza.

It’s not just Jordanian and Egyptian forces. In March 2024, 76% of Gazans (and 53% of West Bank Palestinians) were against the idea of “the immediate deployment of an international force under the UN flag to temporarily police the Gaza Strip and bring about an Israeli withdrawal.” 

In October 2025, in the context of the Trump plan, 52% of Gazans and 78% of West Bank Palestinians opposed armed forces from Egypt, Jordan “and other Arab and Islamic countries” to maintain security in Gaza and disarm Hamas. Opposition dropped slightly in a separate question that asked about foreign Arab forces policing Gaza but excluded disarming Hamas – this time only 47% of Gazans opposed it. 

What does this mean? It means that if a peace-enforcing force is actually sent to Gaza, its efforts to disarm Hamas will not have the backing of the local population – while Hamas’ violent attempts to resist such disarmament will have local support.

A two-state horizon?

Another key assumption in UNSCR 2803 is that Palestinians want to move toward a negotiated two-state outcome.

But support for a two-state outcome has long been in the minority in Palestinian opinion surveys.

Support drops further when details are added. Over the years (particularly between March 2014 and December 2016, and again in December 2018, March 2019 and March 2020) numerous possible two-state scenarios – usually based on proposals floated by the international community – have been detailed in surveys: only small minorities support them. 

In October 2025, Palestinians were asked, “Do you support or oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the borders of June 4, 1967, one that would be demilitarised, with East Jerusalem as its capital, with limited land swaps so that it can live in peace with the State of Israel, with international guarantees?” Overall, 55% of Palestinians opposed this. (That said, a small majority – 61% – of Gazans supported this, compared with only 33% in the West Bank.)

Resolution 2803 therefore, rests on a political horizon that the majority of Palestinians do not support.

The main problem is Hamas

Underlying all of these problems is Hamas. The problem is not simply that it is a well-armed and ideologically-committed organisation backed by Turkey, Qatar and Iran, but that it remains popular among Palestinians. 

In October 2025, a plurality of Palestinians said their support for Hamas had increased since October 7. 

In almost every survey since the start of 2014, Palestinians were asked who they’d vote for in Parliamentary elections if the same candidates as in the 2006 election were available to them. Hamas remained popular throughout, with its popularity skyrocketing immediately after October 7. 

While support for Hamas has dropped since then, it has merely returned to its pre-war levels. Meanwhile, support for Fatah plummeted during the same period, and never recovered.

Similarly, a question asked in almost every survey for 11 years, about support for political parties, saw support for Hamas spike as a result of the October 7 attacks, and stay high. 

Since 2021, when the question was first asked, more Palestinians have reported that they see Hamas as deserving of representing them rather than Fatah. 

In December 2023, March 2024 and June 2024, Palestinians were asked who they would prefer seeing in control of Gaza. An average of 45% of Gazans (and 70% of West Bank Palestinians) chose Hamas. 

Asked five times between March 2024 and October 2025 if they were satisfied with Fatah’s and Hamas’ performance in the war, an average of 26% of Palestinians said they were satisfied with Fatah’s performance, compared with 66% who said they were satisfied with Hamas’ performance. If we disaggregate the data, to just look at Gazan responses, 31% say they are satisfied with Fatah’s performance, compared with a satisfaction rate of 52% for Hamas.

Indeed, an average of 49% of Gazans (and 68% of West Bank Palestinians), in March, June and September 2024, said the return of Hamas dominance was their preferred outcome to the war. 

UNSCR 2803 imagines a technocratically-governed, demilitarised, diplomatically-oriented, internationally-supported transition toward Palestinian self-determination. 

Palestinian public opinion points elsewhere: Violence is seen as effective, diplomacy is not. Demilitarisation is unpopular. Foreign forces are unwanted. Technocrats lack legitimacy. The PA is rejected. Hamas retains support. And a two-state outcome isn’t desired. 

Trump’s ‘Comprehensive Plan’ for Gaza, now endorsed by a Security Council resolution, faces many challenges. But arguably the greatest challenge – almost never discussed – is that the Palestinian public rejects all of the elements that it requires to succeed.