

# Shultz: A Strong Israel - To Make And Keep The Peace

## THE REGION

**F**ORMER U.S. Secretary of State (1982-89) George P. Shultz was the keynote speaker at a dinner in his honour hosted by Australia/Israel Publications and the Australian Institute of Jewish Affairs in Melbourne on March 18 at the Southern Cross Hotel. He was also the recipient of a World Jewish Congress - AIJA human rights award, particularly for his support for Soviet Jewry. Excerpts of Secretary Shultz's speech follow:

... You mentioned the Seder [with refuseniks] in Moscow in April 1987. I remember that Seder vividly.

We thought, these poor oppressed people, and we felt for them. By the time we got through, it was altogether the other way around. I can't tell you the sense of inspiration you get from meeting with people like that, in that setting. Because here were human beings with an indomitable spirit, who knew what they believed, and no state, no force, no prison, no denial could take it away from them. So they had a kind of an inner conviction that was stronger than the rulers of the Kremlin and you couldn't help but take away from it an inspiration for your own efforts.

The next day I went to the Kremlin and actually had a terrific meeting with Gorbachev. But anyway, at one point he went after me hard, he said "I know, I see, you went to that, with those bunch of Jews, in the American Embassy, and you're always meeting with these people, and they're trouble makers, and you're a trouble maker for meeting with them", and so on, and he tackled me. So I listened to him and I said to him finally, "Well, you know, General Secretary, I see what your opinion is of those people, and I have a deal for you. I've got a great big airplane out there at your airport, and there isn't anybody in my party, no member of the press, no security person, none of the professional people, me, my wife, that wouldn't give up their seat on that airplane. So you just let them all get on that airplane, and I can assure you I know three countries that will be glad to take them". And he changed the subject.

But by next year's Passover, that is in 1988, every person who was at that Seder was allowed to emigrate and I will always remember it was about three o'clock in the afternoon in my office, and the phone rings, and I answer and on the other end of the phone this voice comes: "This is Ida Nudel. I'm in Jerusalem. I'm home". It was the most moving moment of my time as Secretary of State, and just thinking about it, I am moved ...

We are emerging into a world where sovereignty is changing in its meaning, and where you see situations everywhere, which you must characterise as a situation of mixed sovereignty.

Now when I think of the problems that confront Israel, with Israel's neighbours, with the Palestinians, it seems to me that the concept that is going to yield an answer in the end is not so much in the sort of unambiguous "land for peace" formula, as it is in a formulation of mixed sovereignty of some sort, because the concept of peace is ambiguous, the concept of land is really ambiguous. I can't imagine in the end in the 'Syria first' strategy or work on the West



Bank, that Israel will so arrange things that it neglects its security interests with respect to those areas. At the same time, I can't imagine that there is an answer in so far as the Palestinians are concerned, unless it recognizes the ethnic orientation of the Palestinians and gives them a sense of themselves, applying in a passport as the saying goes, an identity of some sort. When you consider all of the intricate problems that have to be dealt with involving municipal activities of one kind or another, it seems to me you come to the conclusion that there is no answer except one that is a mixed sovereign situation. I suspect, in the end, something like that will have to be worked out with respect to the Golan Heights.

So I think this broad lesson, that comes out of the reality of an information and knowledge age and its deep meaning for our world and our society, has a direct applicability to the nature of the solution to problems that Israel confronts with its neighbours.

But of course, as has been said earlier there won't be a negotiation unless Israel is strong, so that Israel's neighbours recognize

that there is no military solution for them. I also believe that when there is a solution - I say "when" not "if" - when there is a solution there will need to be an insurance policy that the solution stays in effect and that insurance policy must be continued strength on the part of Israel. **So no doubt there will be a peace dividend but it will not be a large peace dividend, because strength will be necessary to keep the peace, just as strength is necessary to make the peace ...**

I think that the desire for peace in Israel is very broad. I happened to go there about a week after Sadat's visit. I have never seen a group of people so turned on, and so elated, not by the probability of peace, nobody thought it was probable, but at least it was possible. And I think that the desire to move forward is shared across the political spectrum. And I will give you one example, involving a person who is thought of as a very hardline person who never gives any ground, Yitzhak Shamir.

I had an idea, and President Reagan gave me the green light to go ahead with it before the summit meeting that ended up taking place in December 1987. We could see that coming and I had the idea that with King Hussein saying that there needed to be an international umbrella over direct talks, that we should say to the Israelis who resisted the international umbrella, and to Hussein, and then if they agreed, to Gorbachev, suppose the President and General-Secretary Gorbachev invite the Israelis, the Jordanians, and for that matter the Syrians and the Lebanese to join them at the summit meeting in Washington. The idea was that after the meeting that would be the umbrella under which they could then go on and have direct talks.

So then with Shamir we went through long hard discussions, we didn't know whether Shamir would say yes or say no, or what. I was to go over and have dinner with Shamir at the Prime Minister's residence, after which we would have our final discussion. Before I went, Dick Murphy the Assistant Secretary of State said to me, "Either we are going to have a short evening or an all night session." If he says no, we'll just have a pleasant evening and that'll be the end of it, and we'll all have a good night's sleep and go on. If he says yes, we'll be up all night, because you know it's tough negotiating with the Israelis. There'll be a memorandum of understanding like you wouldn't believe. There will be side letters, there will be conditions, these will be so surrounded that we'll be up all night negotiating it, and maybe we will get it done and maybe we

*Continued p. 5 .....*



L-R: Former U.S. Secretary of State, George Shultz, Shadow Minister for Immigration, Senator Jim Short, The Hon. Alan Griffiths, Minister for Industry



L-R: Former Prime Minister Bob Hawke, George Shultz



L-R: Israeli Ambassador Yehuda Avner, George Shultz



# A Wavering Commitment

Lally Weymouth

**A**LTHOUGH Prime Minister Rabin and President Bill Clinton struck up a comfortable relationship during Rabin's recent visit to Washington, the top-level talks that attended the Rabin-Clinton meeting left several important issues unresolved.

From Israel's standpoint, in fact, the talks at one level were a disappointment. Washington rejected Jerusalem's request for several key technologies important to Israel's security. Among other things the Israelis asked for "real time" (instant) intelligence on the Arab world and for software for F-15 and F-16 fighters - both to no avail.

Rabin also asked the US president for cooperation in the realm of space defense. Israel's concerns here cannot be overstated. Despite modest progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process, Israel cannot afford to be sanguine about its vulnerability to attack by

chemical and nuclear weapons.

Rabin stressed to US policymakers that Iran - not Iraq or Syria - poses the most profound threat to Israel. The Iranian threat, as Rabin analyzes it, turns on Iran's growing ability to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction - including nuclear weapons.

One of the most deadly weapons that outlaw countries like Iran may one day launch against Israel is a missile carrying a warhead that separates right after the initial "boost phase" into 50 to 100 separate bomblets, each carrying a deadly toxin. The aim of these bomblets called "cluster munitions," is to deliver death over a wide area.

Such weapons, to be sure, threaten not just Israel and other US allies in the Middle East and in Europe but also US forces deployed overseas.

Indeed, American strategists argue that US security interests require Washington to

pursue the development of a so called "boost phase defense" - high speed small rockets that reach and destroy attacking missiles in their "boost phase" before they release their package of deadly bomblets.

In his talk with Clinton, Rabin stressed the importance to Israel of boost phase defense. Rabin is aware that nearly all the vital programs needed for such a defense in the early or near term have been sharply curtailed by Clinton's Pentagon.

Boost-phase defense has been affected by the \$2.5 billion of budget cuts in the SDI ("Star Wars") program.

This is true despite the fact that a top secret Defense Department study recently concluded that "cluster munitions" pose a dangerous near term threat to US and allied security interests.

It's hard to imagine that the Clinton administration would succeed in its effort to phase out such a program if the American people grasped the fact that it might well one day save the lives of thousands of civilians and American troops stationed abroad.

*International Herald Tribune,*  
(March 29).



## What Rabin Didn't Get In Washington

**I**SRAELI Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's trip to Washington for his first official visit with U.S. President Clinton in mid-March certainly boasted a number of positive achievements. Rabin received assurances from Clinton on co-operating towards countering terror, on maintaining Israel's strategic edge, and on the peace talks. A personal relationship also seems to have developed between the two leaders.

But it should also be pointed out that talks with Clinton and the Pentagon on concrete forms of strategic cooperation were far less successful:

\* The Pentagon has rejected the idea of using Haifa as a "home port" for America's Sixth Fleet, which is based in the Mediterranean. They also rejected the idea of storing U.S. military equipment in Israel for emergency U.S. use. A senior Pentagon official made clear that there were limits to U.S.-Israel military cooperation, saying "port visits, joint exercises and training - yes, home port and pre-positioning [of material] - no," *Jerusalem Post*,

(March 19).

\* Israeli requests for the sharing of real-time satellite data on the Middle East, and new software for F-16 and F-15 fighters, were also refused.

\* The Pentagon declined a proposal to let Israel Aircraft Industries bid on a contract for commercial satellite launchers.

\* American officials refused to accept the Israeli interpretation of the Missile Technology Control Regime treaty, which would have allowed Israel to receive additional American know-how.

Reduced Pentagon budgets, as well as concerns about possible transfer of American knowledge to third parties, were cited as reasons for all of the above.

\* On the positive side, Israel has finally been allowed to purchase an American supercomputer, something long sought. And Clinton has agreed to the establishment of a joint commission for the sale of advanced technology to Israel.

*Tzvi Fleischer, Director of Research*

## Shultz Speech *continued from p.8*

won't". So I said okay and I went over to my dinner with Shamir. And afterwards, our groups gathered and we had a little preliminary discussion and then the Prime Minister looked at me and said, "Well Mr Secretary you know our dreams, you know our nightmares, we trust you, go ahead". That was it! No memorandum of understanding, no side letters, no nothing. He just said "we trust you, go ahead."

King Hussein in the end felt that he

could not agree to this arrangement and he declined, but it made a deep impact on me, about the willingness of the person that I suppose you would think of as the hardest liner in the Israeli political landscape, who nevertheless was willing to role a dice with us.

Margaret Thatcher once put it to me, and Margaret was no fan of Shamir, as I was in London on my way to Israel. She had had a visit from Shamir a few days earlier and she

said "Shamir said something to me that really stuck with me". I said "What's that?" "He said: The United States is a big country. It can make a mistake, it's not fatal. Great Britain can make a mistake, it's not fatal. Israel can only make one mistake. If it makes one big mistake - it's fatal". It's true. So friends of Israel have to help her be strong, avoid mistakes, but also to work for peace.



L-R: Bob Hawke, Solomon Lew, Rosie Lew, George Shultz, Alan Goldberg Q.C.



L-R: George Shultz, Dr Colin Rubenstein, Acting U.S. Ambassador Marilyn Meyers



L-R: Michael Danby, The Hon. Alan Griffiths, The Hon. Clyde Holding, Isi Leibler, Senator Jim Short, Jeremy Jones